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Abstract
Workers in less secure jobs are often paid less than identical-looking workers in more secure jobs. We
show that this lack of compensating differentials for unemployment risk can arise in equilibrium when all
workers are identical and firms differ only in job security (i.e. the probability that the worker is not sent
into unemployment). In a setting where workers search for new positions both on and off the job, the
worker’s marginal willingness to pay for job security is endogenous: it depends on the behavior of all firms
in the labor market and increases with the rent the employing firm leaves to the worker. We solve for the
labor market equilibrium, finding that wages increase with job security for at least all firms in the risky
tail of the distribution of firm-level unemployment risk. Meanwhile, unemployment becomes persistent
for low-wage and unemployed workers, a seeming pattern of ‘unemployment scarring’ created entirely by
firm heterogeneity. Higher in the wage distribution, workers can take wage cuts to move to more stable
employment.
Keywords: Layoff Rates, Unemployment risk, Wage Differentials, Unemployment Scarring
JEL Codes: J31, J63
∗We want to thank numerous colleagues for insightful comments, and Robert Kirkby for excellent research assistance. We also
owe a large measure of gratitude to the editor and two anonymous referees, who helped us improve this paper greatly. Naturally,
all remaining errors are our own. Ludo Visschers acknowledges Simon Fraser University’s President’s Research Grant; the Spanish
Ministry of Economic Affairs’ Project Grant ECO2010-20614 (Dirección General de Investigación Científica y Técnica); the Juan de
la Cierva Fellowship (Ministry of Economic Affairs, Spain), and the Bank of Spain’s Programa de Investigación de Excelencia.
†University of Colorado: Roberto(dot)Pinheiro (at) colorado(dot)edu
‡The University of Edinburgh, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, and CESifo: Ludo.Visschers (at) ed(dot)ac(dot)uk
1
1 Introduction
When a transition to unemployment inflicts a loss of income or utility, workers are willing to give up a part of
their wages in exchange for more job security. In this set up, the risk of becoming unemployed could be seen
as just another job attribute that workers dislike, e.g. the need to spend a lot of additional time commuting
or traveling or a requirement to put in higher levels of effort. However, job security, i.e. the absence of
unemployment risk, is quite different from typical amenities.
For one, job security is naturally complementary to the desirability of the job along all other dimensions,
including, prominently, the wage. For workers, it is one thing to lose a job that is marginally better than
unemployment; it is quite another thing to lose the very best possible job out there. In a frictional labor
market, a job loss incorporates not only the immediate drop in income when becoming unemployed but also
the subsequent labor market outcomes in employment. It is much more difficult and time-consuming to recover
to the best job than it is to find a marginally attractive job. We find that a given incremental increase in job
security is valued more in high-wage employment than low-wage employment, ceteris paribus. Moreover,
the rate at which this valuation of job security increases with the wage is higher, the higher the wage is. Put
differently, the marginal willingness to pay for job security is an increasing and convex function of the firm’s
wages. In contrast, in most hedonic wage models, the marginal willingness to pay is taken to be exogenously
given and constant across wage levels. (See e.g. Bonhomme and Jolivet (2009) and Hwang, Mortensen, and
Reed (1998), who have studied the inclusion of amenities in a frictional labor market – and also have this
feature.1)
A higher unemployment risk can affect firms because it lowers the value of employment for the firm’s
workers, and therefore increases the risk of losing workers to other firms, for a given wage. But it also may
affect the profit maximization of the firm directly, because safer firms have longer employment relationships,
ceteris paribus, which change the firms’ recruitment and retention incentives when they consider which wage
to set. This additional effect cannot be captured in some general utility specification on the workers’ side; to
capture fully the impact of job security and job loss, one rather needs to bring both sides of the market together
and solve for the equilibrium.
Overall, the cost of a job loss depends on market characteristics, prominently the extent of frictions and
the firms’ optimal wage setting responses (which, in turn, take into account the endogenous valuation of job
security on the workers’ side). Given that it takes time for a laid-off worker to climb the job ladder to his
1In order to a hedonic wage model deliver this complementarity, we would need to assume a complementarity between wages and
job amenities within the utility function. However, this leads one to easily ignore that anything that influences firms’ behavior, labor
market flows, or labor market conditions in general, will affect this utility relation.
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previous position, there is a clear loss of earned wages during the process. However, in a market where
different firms offer jobs with distinct levels of job security, a job loss may also imply an increase in future
layoff risk since the displaced worker may take a job at a firm with lower job security. This potential increase
in probability of future unemployment spells, is another component of the cost of job loss2.
In this paper, we propose an equilibrium theory of frictional labor markets that incorporates the different,
endogenous, nature of the valuation of job security. In our model, we follow Burdett and Mortensen (1998),
henceforth referred to as BM, and introduce search frictions and on-the-job search into an otherwise competi-
tive setting. Our sole deviation from the BM setup is that firms differ in the job security they provide 3. Behind
these differences in unemployment risk across firms could, for example, be differences in managerial practices
and their quality (see Syverson, 2004). Bloom and Bloom and Reenen (2007) and Huselid (1995) show that
different managerial practices are at the core of differences in firms’ economic performance. To further pro-
vide an intuitive micro-foundation for firms’ differences in unemployment risk, one can take a page from the
‘knowledge hierarchy’ literature4 and see the firm’s production in terms of a problem solving technology. In
a firm with better managerial practices and more organizational knowledge, there is a higher chance that the
worker is able to satisfactorily accomplish the new task, while relying on knowledge embodied in codes and
procedures. Therefore, the transfer of workers from old to new tasks is more likely to be successful in better
managed firms, reducing worker turnover.
In our model, job security enters directly both in the firm’s optimization and also in the worker’s valuation
in an endogenous, nonlinear way. However, we are able to characterize the equilibrium almost as easily as the
standard BM model. In our model’s equilibrium, riskier firms need to increase their wages more than safer
firms when offering higher values, while they do not gain as much in firm size, relatively. As a result, riskier
firms will find it optimal to offer lower values to workers, and workers move, job by job, towards increasingly
safe firms. Wages will increase with job security at the bottom of the wage/job security distribution, causing the
firms with the lowest job security to be the ones with the lowest wages, contrary to competitive compensating
wage theory. While on the workers’ side the marginal willingness to pay for job security is increasing and
convex in wages, on the firms’ side competition will keep pushing up wages with job security throughout the
2The empirical literature finds that a layoff raises the prospect of shortened employment spells in the future, increasing the prob-
ability of future job losses (e.g. Stevens 1997, Kletzer 1998). This reduction in subsequent employment durations is responsible for
a significant part of the cost of a transition into unemployment (Eliason and Storrie 2006, Boheim and Taylor 2002, Arulampalam et
al. 2000). Moreover, for displaced workers of a given quality, commonly, new jobs come with lower wages, and simultaneously with
a higher risk of renewed unemployment (Cappellari and Jenkins 2008, Uhlendorf 2006, Stewart 2007).
3In order to isolate the impact of the job security channel, firms will not differ in e.g. the instantaneous productivity of jobs.
4See Garicano, 2000 and Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg, 2006
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firm distribution, as long as the density of the firm-level job security distribution is increasing, constant, or
not decreasing too sharply. Only when the density of the firm-level job security distribution decreases sharply
enough could wages drop with job security, in which case some workers would be observed to take wage cuts.
Whether wage cust occur depend also on the rate at which workers receive alternative offers on the job; the
higher the incidence of on-the-job search, the less job security is valued, and the less likely we are to observe
a negative relationship between job security and wages. In fact, if that incidence is high enough, wages can be
strictly increasing in job security.
Overall, our equilibrium is consistent with, first, the lack of compensating wage differentials, and a pos-
itive correlation between wages and job security, as has been documented e.g. in Bonhomme and Jolivet
(2009) and Mayo and Murray (1991), and second, with a pattern of ‘unemployment scarring’ through both
repeated unemployment spells and lower wages, as found e.g. by Stevens (1997) and Kletzer (1998), while
the heterogeneity lies entirely on the firm’s side of the market.5
Finally, we note that, if firm heterogeneity is a leading factor behind the equilibrium patterns described, this
has further implications for policy. After a worker falls off the job ladder into unemployment, the first rungs of
the wage ladder will be more slippery than the higher rungs. Therefore bad labor market outcomes can persist,
and time and luck is needed before a recently unemployed worker can find traction on the job ladder. Until
then, unemployment begets low wages and unemployment. Overall, bad outcomes will be correlated over
time, as will be good outcomes, increasesing the distance between best-case and worst-case outcomes in the
labor market in terms of life-time discounted utility (hence increasing overall risk, given the same aggregate
flows). The resulting increase in inferred risk might have further policy implications 6. Consider the case of
policies which increase the earnings capacity of unemployed workers; these are often thought to decrease the
probability that these workers will subsequently slide back into unemployment. If, however, firm heterogeneity
is what matters and the workers in question keep taking jobs in the same risky firms, the foreseen reduction in
repeat-unemployment might not fully come to pass.
5Additionally, the model produces a correlation between firm size and job security through the same channel as Burdett and
Mortensen (1998), once the ranking of values provided to workers is taken into account.
6This has further implications for consumption and saving choices of workers who have just become unemployed, and, ex ante, for
employed workers who face differing risks of becoming unemployed, with more dire consequences if they do fall off the job ladder
into unemployment. See Lise (2011) for a model linking the climbs of the wage ladder through on-the-job search, and the drops from
the wage ladder, to consumption and savings decisions. In his model, following BM, the risk of dropping from the ladder is constant
across workers and jobs.
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2 Model
A measure 1 of risk-neutral firms and a measure m of risk-neutral workers live forever in continuous time,
discounting the future at rate r. When not matched with a firm, a worker receives unemployment benefits b.
When matched with a firm, the worker produces output p, which is the same in any firm. Firms, however,
differ in the probability δ with which they send workers back into unemployment. We index firms by this
probability, and will refer to a high-δ firm as a “risky firm” and a low-δ firm as a “safe firm.” One can think
that the heterogeneity in δ as standing in for the quality of the firm’s management, manifested, for example,
when the tasks that workers’ do occasionally become obsolete and they need to be given new tasks. A safe
firm with good managers, then, is more likely to provide good guidance for the new task, such that the worker
is likely to keep his productivity level p. In a risky firm, managers are less likely to be able to support the
worker’s transition to the new task and hence, they will have to dismiss the worker more often.7
The distribution function of firm types is H(δ); the distribution may (but does not have to) contain mass
points. Apart from the differences in firms’ layoff risk δ, the remaining setup follows Burdett and Mortensen
(1998). This means that search frictions in the labor market prevent workers from instantaneously matching
with the best firm in the market. Instead, from time to time workers meet randomly with one of the firms in
the market. Concretely, unemployed workers receive a single job offer at a time at Poisson arrival rate λ0,
while employed workers do so at rate λ1. An offer is a wage-layoff risk combination (w, δ) which specifies
the wage w that the firm, which has layoff rate δ, commits to pay as long as the match lasts (it is the same as
the wage of workers already in the firm). The job offer must be accepted or rejected on the spot, and when
rejected it cannot later be recalled. Firms are able to hire everyone who accepts their wage, and they choose
this wage to maximize their steady state profits. In setting profit maximizing wages, firms take into account
both the distribution of wages posted by the other firms in the market and also how workers compare wage
offers from firms with different layoff risks. We first turn to workers’ decisions in the face of differentially
risky firms posting different wages.
7In this interpretation, unproductive tasks by construction have a productivity low enough that no firm wants to keep the worker
in it, just in case any future change in the task portfolio render the worker productive again. Additionally, all productive tasks
have productivity p for simplicity. We take elements here from the ‘knowledge hierarchy’ literature, following Garicano (2000) and
Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006). See also appendix C in which we have spelled out these microfoundations more elaborately. The
environment as we sketch it can also be, loosely, considered to be a normalization with respect to trend, so becoming ‘unproductive’
means becoming unproductive relative to trend.
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2.1 Workers’ Job Offer Acceptance Decisions
Obstructed by the frictions in the labor market, a worker receives a new offer of employment only occasionally
(at Poisson arrival rate λ0 when unemployed, or λ1 when employed). The worker is offered a wage w offered
by a firm with layoff risk δ, and he will accept any offer that improves his life-time expected discounted
income. Because a new offer could come with higher job security but also with a lower wage (or vice versa),
the worker needs to fully rank these two-dimensional job offers by their life-time expected discounted income.
Call V0 the life-time expected discounted income of a worker who is currently unemployed, and V (w, δ)
the value for a worker currently employed at a firm that pays wage w and has a layoff risk δ. To establish
notation, consider that firms with layoff risk δ symmetrically post according to a possibly pure strategy with
cdf Fˆ (w|δ). We can express the value functions of workers as follows: for an unemployed worker, the flow
Bellman equation is
rV0 = b+ λ0
∫ ∫
max{V (w, δ)− V0, 0}dFˆ (w|δ)dH(δ). (1)
The opportunity cost of searching for a job when unemployed (which equals the interest rate on its asset value,
rV0) equals the benefit flow b and the expected capital gain of job search. The latter, in the right-most term
in equation (1), results from receiving, at rate λ0, a job offer (w, δ) randomly drawn from
∫ ∫
dFˆ (w|δ)dH(δ).
An accepted job offer (w, δ) will improve the worker’s lifetime expected value by V (w, δ)− V0 and therefore
an offer will be accepted if and only if this term is strictly positive.8 Similarly, for employed workers we find
rV (w, δ) = w + λ1
∫ ∫
max{V (w′, δ′)− V (w, δ), 0}dFˆ (w′|δ′)dH(δ′) + δ(V0 − V (w, δ)), (2)
where, in addition to the wage and expected capital gains from moving up to better jobs in the middle term on
the right-hand side, the worker also faces an expected capital loss from becoming unemployed, δ(V (w, δ) −
V0).
Suppose that offers arrive from firms with layoff risks identical to the current firm. In this case, the
reservation property in wages follows naturally from equation (2); values V (w, δ) increase with w, and hence
wages above the current wage are acceptable, those below are not. To compare across types of firms, we can
start by looking at indifferences in wages and layoff risks. Consider a worker’s current employment in a firm
with (w1, δ1), and consider an alternative job offer from a firm with (w2, δ2): the worker is indifferent when
V (w2, δ2) = V (w1, δ1); by equation (2) this occurs precisely when
w2 = w1 + (δ2 − δ1)(V (w1, δ1)− V0). (3)
8In case of ties, the worker will remain in his current job.
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Then, if the worker, currently with V (w1, δ1), is offered a larger wage than w2 in a new firm with layoff risk
δ2, he will accept the new job, rejecting it otherwise. Thus, to move to a more risky firm, the worker needs
‘compensation’ in the form of a wage increase; this increase must cover the additional amount of risk taken
on, multiplied by the cost of the layoff (V (w, δ) − V0). We will return to discuss the ‘value’ of job security
in more detail, but let us first use equation (3) to completely characterize the value V (w, δ) associated with
employment in any (w, δ)-firm. The reservation property and the established indifference condition above,
lead to
rV (w, δ) = w+λ1
∫ ( ∫
w+(δ′−δ)(V (w,δ)−V0)
(
V (w′, δ′)−V (w, δ))dFˆ (w′|δ′))dH(δ′)+δ(V0−V (w, δ)). (4)
This implies that (given the indifference at the optimal acceptance choices),9
∂V (w, δ)
∂w
=
1
r + δ + λ1
∫ (
1− Fˆ (w+(δ′−δ)(V (w,δ)−V0)|δ′))dH(δ′) . (5)
To characterize V (w, δ) along the δ-dimension, we can similarly find
∂V (w, δ)
∂δ
= − V (w, δ)− V0
r + δ + λ1
∫ (
1− Fˆ (w+(δ′−δ)(V (w,δ)−V0)|δ′))dH(δ′) . (6)
Together with the relevant initial conditions, equations (5) and (6) form a partial differential equation that we
can solve to fully characterize V (w, δ). This leads to the results stated in lemma 1, where, for notational ease
in its last line (and for use in the subsequent analysis of the firms’ decisions), we define w(V, δ) as the wage
in a firm with layoff risk δ that implies a life-time expected value V to the worker. In other words, w(V, δ) is
the inverse of V (w, δ) in w, given δ.
Lemma 1. (a) Given the reservation wage out of unemployment R0 and wage distributions Fˆ (w|δ), the value
function of employed workers V (w, δ) is the solution to the partial differential equation, defined by (5) and (6)
with initial conditions for every δ,
w(V0, δ) = R0, and V0 =
λ0R0 − λ1b
r(λ0 − λ1) (7)
9Equation (5) has a familiar appearance to the differential equation that captures the relation between values and wages in the
standard Burdett and Mortensen setup (where there is only one value of δ for all firms); there it is given by dV (w)/dw = 1/(r+ δ+
λ1(1− F (w))). Notice, however, that in equation (5) the derivative dV (w)/dw is a function of both w and V (w, δ), instead of only
the former, while V (w, δ) is precisely the endogenous object that we are after. Even with this additional dimension, equation (5), as a
differential equation, remains standard and tractable.
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(b) In equilibrium, R0 satisfies
R0 = b+ (λ0 − λ1)
∫
V0
(V − V0)dF (V ) (8)
with
F (V ) =
∫
Fˆ (w(V, δ)|δ)dH(δ). (9)
We have relegated all proofs to the appendix. Lemma 1 shows that, given the reservation wage out of
unemployment,R0, it is possible to solve directly (in one iteration) for all values as a function of the associated
wage and the firm-level layoff risk V (w, δ). In the second part of the lemma,R0 can be found as the solution of
the fixed point problem in (8), given any set of distributions Fˆ (w|δ) ∀ δ, the posting strategies per firm-type –
for all types, and distributionH(δ) of firm types. It will turn out that we can proceed to the firms’ maximization
and resulting distributions, leaving R0 implicit for the time being. Then, we will find the equilibrium R0 as
the fixed point of a mapping with value distribution F (V ) that incorporates all other equilibrium relations.
In the process of deriving lemma (1), we have quantified the wage increase that is needed to offset a discrete
increase in unemployment risk, w2 − w1 = (δ2 − δ1)(V (w1, δ1)− V0), from equation (3). This difference is
directly related to the concept of the marginal willingness to pay (MWP), employed in ‘hedonic’ estimations of
the value of job amenities, including job security. The latter refers to the derivative of the workers’ indifference
curve in (w, δ)-space, which here is the derivative of equation (3) with respect to δ
MWP =
dw
dδ
∣∣∣∣
V constant
= −
∂V (w,δ)
∂δ
∂V (w,δ)
∂w
= V (w, δ)− V0. (10)
Looking more closely at equation (10), note that at the reservation wage out of unemployment, the marginal
willingness to pay for job security is zero.10 Intuitively, if one is indifferent between being in state A or
B, whether one transits from one to the other, and thus also how frequently one transits, is irrelevant for
well-being. Thus, at the indifference with unemployment, no compensating wages are required to hire out of
unemployment even when R0 > b, and, as a result, the reservation wage out of unemployment is identical for
all firm types. This is why the initial condition in the partial differential equation, R0, in lemma 1, is invariant
with δ in equation (7). At employment values strictly above the value of unemployment, a worker is willing
to give up some of his wage in exchange for an increase in job security. The amount of wage the worker is
willing to give up for the same difference in job security increases as the worker’s value in his current job
increases. Thus, there is an intuitive, but critical complementary between the attractiveness of a job, i.e. the
10See also Burdett and Mortensen 1980.
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rent a worker receives in a job, and how he values job security. In terms of wages: since the value of the job
increases with the wage paid, and more strongly so the higher the wage level is, the MWP can be easily shown
to be increasing and convex in the wage paid, ceteris paribus.11
Second, the worker’s marginal willingness to pay for job security depends not only on the wage of the firm
in question, but also on the extent of frictions in the labor market and on the choices of the firms, captured in
the joint distribution of firms’ job security and the wages these firms post. These dimensions are all subsumed
in the rent of the worker’s employment in his current firm, V (w, δ) − V0, and can be made visible, e.g. by
writing this difference out, using equations (1) and (2),
MWP =
1
r
((
w − b
)
−λ0
(
(1− F (V (w, δ)))(V (w, δ)− V0)
)
− λ0
V (w,δ)∫
V0
(V −V0)dF (V )
− (λ1−λ0)
( ∫
V (w,δ)
(V −V (w, δ))dF (V )
)
− δ(V (w, δ)− V0)
)
. (11)
In equation (11), the first term, w− b, captures that the value of job security (i.e. MWP) in a job indeed strictly
increases with its wage, compared to the benefit flow b in unemployment. When a worker loses his job and
becomes unemployed, the adverse shock to life-time income is mitigated when he can re-enter employment
quickly, particularly when the new job is at least as good as the old job. The probability that the displaced
worker finds such employment depends on both the arrival rate λ0 of offers while unemployed and the measure
of firms that provide a value at least as good as the old job, i.e. V ≥ V (w, δ). This probability is captured
in the second term in equation (11). A laid-off worker might also find employment inferior in value to his
previous job; this allows him to at least partially recover the lost income (in the third term of equation (11));
and also decreases his willingness to pay for job security. The next term, on the second line, accounts for
the possibility that an employed worker occassionally receives offers allowing a move to an even better firm.
The rate of meeting these ‘desirable’ firms might increase or decrease upon being laid off, depending on
whether the arrival rate of offers in unemployment, λ0, is larger or smaller, respectively, than the arrival rate
of offers when employed, λ1. This will increase or decrease, respectively, the value of job security, while also
depending on the measure of firms offering such a (further) improvement of conditions relative to V (w, δ).
Finally, as shown in the last term of equation (11), the willingness to trade off wages for an incremental change
in job security also depends on the baseline level of unemployment risk in the worker’s existing job; the same
(absolute) change in job security in a very safe job has a more profound effect on the worker’s value than is a
job which very likely will end soon anyway.
11The derivative of the marginal willingness to pay with respect to w equals ∂V (w, δ)/∂w > 0 in equation (5). The second
derivative ∂2V (w, δ)/(∂w∂w) is also positive.
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To put this in a broader perspective, the valuation of job security we derive above differs from the way
it is usually considered, in which standard methods for inferring the value of a generic amenity are applied
to job security as well. The assumptions underlying these methods are (implicitly) thought to apply equally
to the ‘amenity’ job security. However, we can draw some interesting contrasts between the assumptions and
implications of these methods, and those of job security in our setting. To do so, we will take a step back and
first consider the valuation of firm-level job security when using conventional methods, before returning to
highlight differences with our setting.
The perhaps most-used method of valuing amenities in general is based on hedonic wage regressions, in
which the wage as dependent variable is regressed on amenity measures and controls, e.g. for worker quality.
In its most straightforward interpretation, the estimated relationship is thought to trace out identical workers’
indifference curve between wages and amenities. To link the regression coefficient of an amenity measure to
the marginal willingness to pay for it, a static utility function is posited that is linear and additively separable
in wages and amenities.12 However, the coefficients in these hedonic wage regressions, estimated in the cross
section, are problematic: they are often statistically insignificant, and in many case have an unexpected sign
after controlling for observable and unobservable worker heterogeneity. (See e.g. Bonhomme and Jolivet
(2009), who discuss this in detail, both with regard to their data findings and the literature.)
Hwang et al. (1998) show that when search frictions matter in the labor market, the empirical cross-
sectional relationship between wages and amenities can structurally deviate from the underlying marginal
willingness to pay of workers. For example, firms which are better at producing amenities, ceteris paribus,
will choose to provide higher overall utility to workers. If all else is indeed equal, the ‘marginal willingness
to pay’ as found in hedonic wage regressions is biased downward. While Hwang et al. confine themselves to
simulation exercises, Bonhomme and Jolivet (2009) estimate a partial-equilibrium version of their model on a
set of amenities that includes subjectively reported job security, and find that the model implies a high marginal
willingness to pay, even though the cross-sectional relationship is very different, often wrongly-signed.
In Hwang et al. (1998) and Bonhomme and Jolivet (2009) all job amenities enter the workers’ static (or
instantaneous) utility function in a non-pecuniary way. In their setup, the valuation of an amenity is, in a sense,
taken to be ‘fundamental’, an invariant aspect of the environment. In addition, the utility function of wages
12To make this explicit, let the static utility be v(w, a), where w is wages and a is the vector of amenities. To be able to construct a
‘hedonic wage function’ which rationalizes the regression under the assumption that all firms offer the same utility, i.e. v(w, a) = v¯,
we must be able to isolate w on one side of equation, which means that w enters this utility additively separable. Moreover, given
these assumptions, observing combinations of wages and amenities (w, a) and (w′, a′) allows us to calculate the average willingness
to pay; to let this pin down the marginal willingness to pay as well, one assumes that the marginal willingness is constant, hence the
utility resulting utility function is v(w, a) = w + γa.
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and amenities in these papers keeps the same additive and linear form as was behind the standard hedonic
wage functions. In contrast, in our setting job security enters differently in the worker’s utility. It is, rather,
‘instrumental’: workers care about increasing their job security, not because it is instantaneously enjoyable, but
because it implies that the realized stream of future incomes –which is what they fundamentally care about–
will likely be larger.13
Then, the valuation of job security is not an unknown that needs to be estimated from the wages and/or quit
behavior in workers’ current jobs as a function of those jobs’ professed layoff risk. Instead it can be inferred
by comparing streams of income realizations when the worker would keep his job, to those that would result
after losing his job.14 In other words, incorporating labor market dynamics more fully, as we have done above
in a setting with on-the-job search and firm heterogeneity in layoff risk, could inform us about the valuation of
job security itself and more broadly, how worker overall well-being varies within the labor market. The theory
thus pushes us to use additional dimensions of labor market data to measure the value of job security and its
impact on the labor market.
Furthermore, this approach draws attention to how the shape of the valuation of job security is molded
by labor market conditions. We have already discussed the intuitive complementarity between a job’s wages
(or even better, the worker’s rent) and the job’s security when taking the ‘instrumental’ approach towards job
security. This stands in contrast to a valuation of job security that is independent of the job’s wage, as is
required in standard hedonic wage analyses (and analyses building on these), to be able to isolate wages on
one side of the equation and amenities on the other side. In other words, it assumes that job security is equally
valued across the wage distribution.
Fundamentally, a worker values job security more when he has a lot to lose from becoming unemployed,
which occurs precisely when he is in high-wage, otherwise relatively secure job, which cannot be found easily
when looking for jobs in the labor market. The latter part of this sentence captures (as did equation (11)
beforehand) that frictions enter the valuation of job security. In contrast, in previous analyses that incorporated
13Other amenities, such as a company car, or sport or child care facilities, are clearly well-captured by a contemporaneous ‘fun-
damental’ utility flow. Job security differs because it affects future outcomes, not today’s consumption. It would interact with these
amenities in the same way as it interacts with income in our setting . In general, the worker would compare the expected stream of
utility and how it is affected by job security.
14Confining oneself to wage and turnover data within a job spell to estimate amenity valuation is more difficult in the case of job
security, as observed transitions into unemployment imply that quits will not be observed for those spells. Bonhomme and Jolivet avoid
this by the additional use of self-reported data on the worker’s satisfaction level with respect to job security”. However, the mapping
from an answer to this question to objective job security measurement is not without difficulties. Bonhomme and Jolivet (2009) deal
with these by considering the survey answer to map to a binary (threshold) job security measure and incorporating controls for the
unobservable individual-level heterogeneity in answering the survey question.)
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frictions, they help to explain the wedge between the coefficient in the hedonic wage regression and the actual
marginal willingness to pay, but do not enter the marginal willingness to pay itself. This leads to different
results when the degree of frictions is varied. Hwang et al. (1998) and Bonhomme and Jolivet (2009) discuss at
length how a reduction in frictions can bring the estimated coefficient of the cross-sectional hedonic regression,
which is affected by frictions, closer to the marginal willingness to pay, which is ‘deep’ and invariant to
frictions.15 While this applies to the generic amenity that is consumed on the spot, job security is different:
a change in frictions also changes the ease with which an laid-off worker can make up his losses in new
employment. Now there are two counteracting effects when frictions decrease: firms will be forced to offer
more similar utility; simultaneously, workers will consider job security a less important dimension of jobs, and
will have a reduced marginal willingess to pay for it. We will study the overall impact that changes in frictions
have on equilibrium outcomes in section 3.
Finally, the fact that in some jobs the worker values job security more than in other jobs, is not only
an important feature behind workers’ choices, it also reverberates through the choices which firms make in
competition, as we shall see in the remainder of section 2. In the next sections, we will see that this comes
up in a number of ways. Because wages and job security complement interact in the worker’s lifetime utility,
job security may (or may not) bring a lot of advantage in recruitment. However, job security also affects the
firms’ profit maximization in separate ways. The reduced outflow rate into unemployment in a more secure
firm prolongs the expected time its workers contribute to the firm’s life-time profit, which affects the wages
the firm will optimally choose (with an eye on recruitment and retention). As some firms send more of their
workers back to unemployment, these firms have less workers for other firms to poach. All these issues affect
the firms’ decision making and all would be missed if job security would be placed in the utility only.
Overall, the workers’ heterogeneous valuation of job security, which depends on the distribution of wages
posted by firms, affects individual firms’ behavior in turn, making the valuation of job security a true equilib-
rium object. Then, in general, any change in policy variables which are thought to affect wages or flows in
the labor market will affect the valuation of job security as well. In section 2.2, we will proceed to consider
the firms’ profit maximization, taking into account the endogenous valuation of job security. In section 2.3,
we show how this affects the way workers are distributed over firms. Finally, we will put the two sides of the
market together, to fully characterize the equilibrium in section 2.4.
15Although interestingly, Bonhomme and Jolivet (2009) find that local changes around the estimated extent of frictions will not
radically alter the inferred difference between the marginal willingness to pay and the estimated coefficient of the hedonic wage
regression, which remains substantial.
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2.2 The Firm’s Problem and Labor Market Equilibrium
Firms face the problem to pick the wage that maximizes their steady state profits. If a firm pays a higher wage,
workers will value being employed in this firm more relative to other firms. As a result, workers employed
in other firms are more likely to move into the firm whenever they receive the firm’s wage offer. Similarly,
when the firm’s own workers receive alternative offers, they are more likely to reject those and stay with the
firm. Therefore, with higher wages facilitating recruitment and retention, the firm employs more workers in
the steady state. While this force pushes overall profit upwards, it comes at the cost of earning less profit per
worker, p−w, which pushes profits downwards. At the optimal wage, the firm balances those two counteracting
dimensions, maximizing total steady-state profits. As we will see below, this balance works out differently for
firms with different degrees of job security.
To explicitly find the profit-maximizing wage for each firm, we first look at how steady state firm sizes
vary by the value provided to the worker and the firm’s layoff rate. The latter is directly relevant for firm size:
even if the value they offer to worker is the same, risky firms lose workers at a faster rate and will be smaller as
a result. When firms are in steady state, their inflows must be completely balanced by their outflows. Since we
are dealing with measures of firms and workers, we first look at the inflow and outflow measures of workers
in a positive measure of firms, then take the appropriate limit to isolate the firm size, l(V, δ).
Using V (w, δ), we can define F˜ (V, δ) as the joint distribution of firm-level unemployment risk δ and firm-
offered value V . Here we rather use values V than wages, because worker mobility, and therefore worker
flows, are directly dictated by these values. Distribution F˜ (V, δ) is constructed with the equilibrium wage
choices of firms of each type δ, Fˆ (w|δ), the translation of these wages into values V (w, δ) (and this func-
tion’s inverse w(V, δ)), and the distribution of the firms’ layoff risk δ, in H(δ). Formally, F˜ (V, δ) equals∫
δ′≤δ Fˆ (w(V, δ
′))dH(δ′).
With standard random matching (see Podczeck and Puzzello 2011), and in steady state, the measure of
workers who are employed at values weakly below V , in firms with a layoff risk rate weakly below δ, G˜(V, δ),
must satisfy16∫
δ′≤δ,V0≤V ′≤V
(
δ′ + λ1
∫
V˜ >V
dF˜ (V˜ , δ˜) + λ1
∫
δ˜>δ,
V≥V˜ >V ′
dF˜ (V˜ , δ˜)
)
dG˜(V ′, δ′)(m− u) =∫
δ′≤δ,V0≤V ′≤V
(
λ0u+ λ1
∫
δ˜>δ,V˜ <V ′
dG˜(V˜ , δ˜)(m− u)
)
dF˜ (V ′, δ′). (12)
The left-hand side captures the outflow, consisting of (in order of appearance) the outflow to unemployment
(δ′), to firms with a higher value V˜ > V , and to firms with higher δ′ > δ which offer values better than the
16Note that, since mass can be concentrated at a single (V, δ), we are explicit whether the boundaries are included.
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worker’s value V ′ in his current firm, but weakly lower than V . The right-hand side accounts for the inflows,
first from unemployment, and second, from firms with δ′ > δ with values V˜ below the new firm’s V ′.
Together with the joint firm-type offer distribution F˜ (V, δ), the steady-state equality of inflows and out-
flows in (12) pins down the distribution of employees across firms, G˜(V, δ). It follows that G˜(V, δ) is ab-
solutely continuous with respect to F˜ (V, δ): if a subset A ∈ R2 has probability ∫A dF˜ (V, δ) equal to zero,
then the LHS of (12), adapted to integrate only over the set A, equals zero; since δ > 0,∀δ, it must be
that
∫
A dG˜(V, δ) = 0 as well. Then, by the Radon-Nikodym theorem, a function l(V, δ) exists such that
(m−u)G˜(V, δ) = ∫ VV0∫ δδ l(V ′, δ′)dF˜ (V ′, δ′); Roughly, l(V, δ) corresponds to the measure of employed work-
ers divided by the measure of firms, as both get very small, and we take this as the firm’s size, in lemma
2.
Lemma 2. The size of a firm posting a wage of which the equivalent wage is V , only depends on aggregate
offer distributions of values, F (V ), the aggregate distribution of workers over values, G(V ), and on the firm’s
own δ,
l(V, δ) =
λ0u+ λ1G
−(V )(m− u)
λ1(1− F+(V )) + δ , (13)
where G−(V ) =
∫
V ′<V dG˜(V
′, δ′), F+(V ) =
∫
V ′≤V dF˜ (V
′, δ′). (Note, these are integrated over the entire
set of δ).
Likewise for unemployment,
λ0u
∫
V≥V0
dF˜ (V, δ) = (m− u)
∫
δdG˜(V, δ) (14)
The fact that the size of a firm will be affected by both the value (or wage) offered to the worker and its own
unemployment risk stands in contrast to BM, and to Bontemps et al., who allow many sources of heterogeneity
on the firm and worker side, but keep the property that the firm size only depends on the wage. As a direct
consequence of the dependence of firm size on both value V and unemployment risk δ, the distribution function
of workers, G(V ) = (m − u)−1 ∫V ′≤V l(V ′, δ′)dF˜ (V ′, δ′), depends also on the type of the firms that offer
each value V . Consider a subset of values which are offered predominantly by riskier firms: these firms send
workers into unemployment at a faster rate. If these firms offer high values, they will attract many workers,
who all will be subjected to a high unemployment risk, which generates a large inflow into unemployment; if
they offer low values, only a smaller subset of employed workers will be subject to this increased risk. Hence,
the average unemployment risk in the labor market depends on the joint distribution of firm types and value.
Likewise, a firm’s recruitment inflow from other firms depends not only on the number of firms that offer less
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attractive employment, but also on the unemployment risk at these firms. A higher risk at these firms, ceteris
paribus, translates into less workers that can be poached from other firms with more workers in unemployment.
This affects the competition for workers and therefore the firms’ wages and values posted. Because the inflow
from unemployment is not responsive to wages (as long as the wage remains above R0), and smaller firms
imply less gains of offering higher wages to poach workers, different wages will be posted. In equilibrium, we
have to take these dependencies into account.
Formally, a firm with layoff rate δ chooses w to maximize (p−w)l(V (w, δ), δ). Combining lemma 1 and
lemma 2, we can derive that safer firms will offer better values, and the rank of the firm in the value distribution
corresponds to the ranking with respect to job security.
Proposition 1 (Ranking Property). Suppose in equilibrium a riskier firm (with layoff risk δh) and a safer firm
(with layoff risk δl, with δl < δh) offer wages of resp. ws and wr. Then, we must have V (ws, δl) ≥ V (wr, δh).
Below we prove proposition 1 without reference to the shape of H(δ), and therefore holds also whether it
is a discrete, continuous, or a mixture distribution. To establish the proposition, we look at both the relative
gains in the steady state number of workers in firm and the relative losses in profit-per-worker, when offering
a higher value. First, consider how much larger a firm will be in steady state when offering a larger V ′, as
opposed to V
l(V ′, δ)
l(V, δ)
=
λ0u+ λ1G
−(V ′)(m−u)
λ0u+ λ1G−(V )(m−u) ×
λ1(1−F+(V )) + δ
λ1(1−F+(V ′)) + δ . (15)
Now, consider how for an increase of offered value from Vl to Vh, firm size increases by a relatively larger
amount when considering a safer δl-firm (with δl < δh.) As the inflows into a firm only depend on the value
offered, here Vh or Vl, the first term on the right-hand side is the same for any δ-type of firm. Outflows on the
other hand, depend on the unemployment risk. The flow of workers lost to other firms, is a relatively more
important component of overall outflows in safer firms, λ1(1−F
+(Vl))+δl
λ1(1−F+(Vh))+δl ≥
λ1(1−F+(Vl))+δh
λ1(1−F+(Vh))+δh , for δl < δh, and
hence a change in this component has a larger effect on firm size for safer firms . As a result, safer firms gain
relatively more in firm size from offering a higher value,
Vh ≥ Vl =⇒ l(Vh, δl)
l(Vl, δl)
≥ l(Vh, δh)
l(Vl, δh)
, (16)
and the converse holds in strict inequalities. Put differently, for a given increase in value V , the accompanying
relative increase in expected job duration for the firm’s workers is higher in a safer firm: as a result, safer firms
care more about worker retention than riskier firms. Thus, job security does not only enter the valuation of
workers, it also enters the firm’s objective function directly.
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Second, consider the profit flow per worker, p − w(V, δ) for a δ-type firm providing a value V to its
workers. The relative loss of profit when offering a higher value Vh, instead of Vl, to the worker, is given by
w(Vh,δ)−w(Vl,δ)
p−w(Vl,δ) . From the worker’s indifference in ‘compensating wage’ equation (3), we know that, when two
firms need to provide the same worker’s value V > V0, the safer firm can do so while paying a lower wage,
i.e. w(V, δl) < w(V, δh), making a higher profit per worker at value V . Moreover, equation (5) has told us that
a change of value in riskier firms requires a larger change in wage than in safer firms; for Vh > Vl, we have
∀ V, dV (w, δh)
dw
∣∣∣∣
V (w,δh)=V
<
dV (w, δl)
dw
∣∣∣∣
V (w,δl)=V
=⇒ w(Vh, δh)−w(Vl, δh) > w(Vh, δl)−w(Vl, δl). (17)
Then, the relative loss of profit of offering larger values is larger for risky firms for two reasons: because they
need to raise wages more (in the numerator), and because, to begin with, their profits at baseline value Vl > V0
(in the denominator) are lower, so even if the required change in wages would be the same for the safe and
risky firm, it would still lead to a larger relative profit loss still for the risky firm,
Vh > Vl ≥ V0 ⇐⇒ w(Vh, δh)− w(Vl, δh)
p− w(Vl, δh) >
w(Vh, δl)− w(Vl, δl)
p− w(Vl, δl) . (18)
⇐⇒ p− w(Vh, δh)
p− w(Vl, δh) <
p− w(Vh, δl)
p− w(Vl, δl) . (19)
Now consider the optimal value Vr for a riskier firm, and the optimal value Vs for a safer firm. The riskier firm
makes more profits at Vr than at Vs, while this is reversed for the safer firm. This means that
(p− w(Vs, δl))l(Vs, δl)
(p− w(Vr, δl))l(Vr, δl) ≥
(p− w(Vs, δh))l(Vs, δh)
(p− w(Vr, δh))l(Vr, δ) . (20)
But by equation (19) and the converse of equation (15), it follows from the optimality conditions for δh and
δl-firms in inequality (20) that it must be that Vs ≥ Vr, proving proposition 1.
Overall, intuitively, a safer firm gains relatively more in firm size from offering a higher value, while giving
up strictly less (in relative terms) in profit per worker. Combined, a safer firm will gain strictly more in overall
profit (or lose less) than the riskier firm when offering a higher value. Then, if Vr is optimal for the riskier
firm, the safer firm will strictly gain when instead of offering V < Vr, it offers Vr itself (as the risky firm gains
weakly from doing this). As a result, the safer firm will indeed optimally offer Vs or higher.
In the case that amenities would enter additively in the utility, and some firms could provide higher levels
of the amenity more cheaply, these firms would also offer higher values in equilibrium, ceteris paribus (as is
shown in Hwang et al. 1998). However, this effect would go entirely through the denominator of equation
(18): when raising their value to workers, these firms would incur the same additional wage cost as any other
firm copying the raise in worker value, they would also reap the same benefit in firm size as any other firm, but
since their level of profit per worker is higher to begin with, they would lose less profit per worker in relative
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terms. Compared to other firms, this makes it more profitable for them to offer higher values. In our case,
there are two additional forces that, crucially, all work in the same direction: for the safer firm, the relative gain
in firm size is larger when raising the value, in equation (15), and they need to raise wages less (in absolute
terms) to provide the additional value, in eqation (17).
While this establish that safer firms offer better values, we cannot make inferences yet about the actual
wages posted – the higher job security of safer firms by itself might (more than) deliver the higher value
required in equilibrium. Below will be able to explicitly link firm types to wages, in a tractable way. Towards
this, let us first define the state state equilibrium properly, and then take several steps to characterize this
equilibrium.
Definition 1. The steady state equilibrium in this labor market consists of distributions Fˆ (w|δ), F˜ (V, δ),
G˜(V, δ), F (V ), G(V ); an unemployment rate u; a value function V (w, δ) for employed workers, and a value
V0 and reservation wage R0 for unemployed workers, such that
1. workers’ utility maximization: optimal mobility decisions result in a value function V (w, δ) for em-
ployed workers, and a reservation wage R0, with associated value V , according to equations (5)-(9),
given Fˆ (w|δ) and H(δ).
2. Firms’ profit maximization: givenF (V ),G(V ) and V (w, δ), for each δ, ∃ pi such that ∀w ∈ supp Fˆ (w|δ),
it holds that pi = (p−w)l(V (w, δ), δ) and ∀w /∈ supp Fˆ (w|δ), pi ≥ (p−w)l(V (w, δ), δ), where l(V, δ)
is given by (13).
3. steady state distributions follow from individual decisions aggregated up. For firms: F˜ (V, δ) is derived
from Fˆ (w|δ) and H(δ) using V (w, δ). For workers: G˜(V, δ), and u follow from the steady state la-
bor market flow accounting in (12)-(14). ‘Aggregate’ value distributions F (V ) and G(V ) follow from∫
V ′≤V dF˜ (V, δ), and
∫
V ′≤V dG˜(V, δ).
Adapting the proofs in BM and Bontemps et al. to incorporate the heterogeneity in δ, we can show that
F (V ) is a continuous, strictly increasing distribution function, and so is G(V ). The intuition for this also
follows the aforementioned papers: mass points in the distribution of offered wages or intermediate intervals
where no firms offer wages, allow discrete gains in firm size or profit per worker, while the costs of such
deviation can be made arbitrarily small.
Proposition 2. In equilibrium, we can derive the following about derived distribution F (V ): (i) The support
of the distribution of values offered in equilibrium is a connected set, (ii) there are no mass points in F (V ),
(iii) the lowest value offered is V0, i.e. F (V0) = 0. Properties (i)-(iii) likewise hold for G(V ) derived from
F (V ) and (12).
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This implies that F (V ) and G(V ) are strictly increasing, continuous functions between V0 (with F (V0) =
G(V0) = 0) and some V¯ (with F (V¯ ) = G(V¯ ) = 1). Combining proposition 1 and proposition 2, the
conditional distribution function Fˆ−1(δ|V ) has all probability mass concentrated at a unique δ. Conversely,
if H(δ) has a continuous probability density, it also follows that each δ posts a unique value. This does not
imply that an actual wage w is offered by at most one δ-type of firm: overlaps in the actual wage distribution
(with concomitant wage cuts in transitions) are possible, as we show below.
One of the strengths of the results is that, although now workers and firms are affected by two dimensions,
wages and job security, and the valuation of the latter is endogenous, solving for the firm size distribution and
subsequently the equilibrium wage distributions can be done (almost) as as easily and as explicitly as in BM.
We turn to this now.
2.3 Equilibrium Firm Sizes
Already employed workers move to new jobs in different firms when these offer a higher value of employment.
Thus, for worker mobility, the level of worker’s value itself is not relevant, it only matters how it is ranked
relative to the other firms’ values (and to the value of unemployment V0). Now, in addition, the ‘ranking
property’ in proposition 1 tells us that the firm with rank z in the value distribution F (V ) must be the firm
with unemployment risk that has rank 1−z in firm-type distribution H(δ) in equilibrium (since values offered
are strictly decreasing in layoff risk). It follows that the firm’s rank z captures both the workers’ job-to-job and
the job-to-unemployment mobility and, as a result, we are able to solve for equilibrium firm sizes as a function
of rank z only, without any further reference to equilibrium wages paid or value levels.
Formally, define firm rank z as z = F (V ); by proposition 2, we have the F (V ) is continuous and strictly
increasing, so V (z) = F−1(z) exists, and is unique. We can also define the firm’s layoff risk as a function
of equilibrium firm rank in the value distribution, δ(z); in equilibrium this is the layoff risk associated with
zth firm, starting from the most risky firm. 17 Similarly, define Gz(z) = G(V (z)) as the proportion of
employed workers at firms ranked z or lower. Moreover, using that Fˆ−1(δ|V ) concentrates mass at a unique
δ, and the absolute continuity of F (V ), which both follow from proposition 2, we can write down an intuitive
17To formally deal with mass points inH(δ), defineH(δ) as the closed graph of 1−H(δ), then let δ(z) def= max{δ|conv(H(δ)) =
z}.Taking the maximum here is without loss of generality for our results, since alternative assumptions at points where the convex
closure of H(δ) is an interval, would change δ only for a zero measure of firms.
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correspondence between firm size and rank as follows, given z = F (V ),
Gz(z)(m− u) = G(V )(m− u) =
∫
V ′≤V
l(V, δ)dF (V, δ)
=
∫ z
0
λ0u+ λ1G
z(z′)(m− u)
λ1(1− z′) + δ(z′) dz
′ (21)
Though the necessary substitutions above involve a surplus of notation, the intuition of the firm size is straight-
forward: the steady state firm size is given by the ratio of worker inflows to the rate of outflows, now functions
of ranking z only.18 Rank z determines layoff risk through equilibrium mapping δ(z), while proportion of
employed workers below rank z, Gz(z), is implicitly defined by equation (21) itself. From the last line in (21),
it follows that the individual firm size l(z) is given by
l(z) =
dGz(z)
dz
(m− u) = λ0u+ λ1G
z(z)(m− u)
λ1(1− z) + δ(z) . (22)
Comparing this to firm size in (13), l(V, δ) = (λ0u + λ1G(V )(m − u))/(λ1(1 − F (V )) + δ), using the
continuity of F (V ) and G(V ), we see that a reformulation of firm size in terms of firm rank z is as intuitive
as before. Inflows in the numerator of (22) consist of a flow from unemployment λ0u, and a flow from the
measure of workers who are employed by lower-ranked firms, (m − u)Gz(z), who would move to the firm
whenever they get the chance, which depends on offer arrival rate λ1. The outflow rate, in the denominator,
is determined by the amount of higher-ranked firms (1 − z), the rate at which workers meet these firms, λ1,
and the firm’s own layoff rate, δ(z). Proposition 2 tells us that F (V ) is strictly increasing and continuous
on a connected support of values V , and hence the mapping z = F (V ) is invertible, continuous and strictly
increasing as well, allowing us to change the variable to z in employment distribution function Gz(z) in (21),
and in firm size l(z) in (22) (using the steps in footnote 18, where proposition 1 allows us to construct the
mapping δ(z)).
18To see the substitutions needed to yield the result in equation (21), consider∫
V ′≤V
l(V, δ)dF (V, δ) =
∫ V
V0
∫
δ
λ0u+ λ1G(V
′)(m− u)
λ1(1− F (V ′)) + δ dFˆ (δ|V
′)dF (V ′)
=
∫ V
V0
λ0u+ λ1G(V
′)(m− u)
λ1(1− F (V ′)) + δ(F−1(V ′))dF (V
′)
=
∫ z
0
λ0u+ λ1G
z(z′)(m− u)
λ1(1− z′) + δ(z′) dz
′ =
∫ z
0
l(z′)dz′
where in the first step, we split up dF (V, δ) into dF (δ|V )dF (V ), after which proposition 2 tells us that F (δ|V ) all mass concentrated
at one and only one δ. In the next line, we substitute this into the function δ(z) (which uses the type-ranking of proposition 1 and the
strict monotonicity of F (V ) of proposition 2), leaving us with an integration over V ′. Finally, the last line incorporates the change of
variable to z = F (V ).
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The implicit relationship between z and Gz(z) in equation (21) is the solution to differential equation
dGz(z)
dz
=
λ0u
m−u + λ1G
z(z)
λ(1− z) + δ(z) (23)
with initial condition Gz(0) = 0, which follows directly from (22). Note that there is no reference to another
equilibrium object in this formulation of the distribution but Gz(z) itself. Given this, we can now solve
explicitly for firm size l(z) and distribution Gz(z), which is done in the next lemma.
Lemma 3. The cumulative density functionGz(z), and equilibrium firm size l(z) and measure of unemployed,
are given by: u = m
∫ 1
0 δ(z)g(z)dz
λ0+
∫ 1
0 δ(z)g(z)dz
= (λ0)
−1 ∫ 1
0 δ(z)l(z)dz, and
Gz(z) =
λ0u
λ1(m− u)
(
e
∫ z
0
λ1
λ1(1−z′)+δ(z′)
dz′ − 1
)
, (24)
l(z) =
λ0u
λ1(1− z) + δ(z)e
∫ z
0
λ1
λ1(1−z)+δ(z′)
dz′
. (25)
The dependence of the size of the zth-ranked firm on the unemployment risks of all lower ranked firms
is explicit in the integral term in the exponent. Solving firm size as a function of the firm rank does not only
yield a clean and simple expression for firm size, because it does rely on a minimal set of relevant parameters,
it also allows for general probability distributions of firm types through δ(z). Concretely, this means that the
formulation in lemma 2 can deal with discrete distributions as easily as it can deal continuous distributions, or
any mixture of these. We expect that this approach can be applied more generally when a firm-specific factor
affects the firm size separately from the rank that the firm occupies in the workers’ preference. This would
work as long as one is able to establish a mapping between this factor and the equilibrium rank in the firm
distribution of values offered to workers, as proposition 1 does for unemployment risk.19
19We can be more explicit in the case of a pure discrete and a purely continuous distribution. For a continuous probability density
h(δ) with H ′(δ) = h(δ) > 0, δ(z) is differentiable everywhere with δ′(z) > 0, and with the appropriate change of variable , this
results in
l(δ) =
λ0u
λ1 + δ¯
e
∫ δ¯
δ −
(
2λ1h(δ)+1
λ1(1−H(δ))+δ
)
dδ˜
.
In case of a discrete distribution h(δj), j = 1, . . . , J, with
∑
j h(δj) = 1 and δ¯ = δ1 > . . . > δ = δJ , lemma 3 tells us that the
mass of workers in δi firms, v(δi) can be derived from (24), using e
∫ b
a
λ1
λ1(1−z)+δ dz = λ1(1−za)+δ
λ1(1−zb)+δ . Suppose that
∑j−1
i=1 h(δi) < z <
1−∑Ji=j+1 h(δi) for some j. Then from (24),
G(z) =
λ0u
λ1(m− u)
(
λ1(1−∑Ji=j h(δi)) + δj
λ1(1− z) + δj
j−1∏
i=1
λ1(1−∑Jh=i h(δi)) + δi
λ1(1−∑Jh=i+1 h(δi)) + δi − 1
)
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2.4 Equilibrium Wage Distributions
In the previous section, we have derived equilibrium firm size as a function of firm rank in the value distribu-
tion. In this section, we link these firm sizes to the wage setting of firms. Instead of formulating the firm’s
problem as choosing the optimal wage (which in equilibrium implies a certain rank z = F (V (w, δ))), we
formulate it equivalently as the firm choosing a rank z (which in equilibrium implies a wage w and an asso-
ciated value V ). Firm optimization in equilibrium requires that a firm that is ranked z by job security does
not want to deviate to another rank z′ in the value distribution. Therefore, a first order condition that needs
to hold for each firm in equilibrium pins down how locally values change with firm rank. This condition,
however, depends on the wage w and on the value V at a given firm rank. Hence, we need to keep track of
both wages and values as a function of firm rank; this introduces a second condition that needs to be satisfied
in equilibrium. It makes our setting different from the standard model, where one equation is sufficient to
characterize equilibrium wages (given initial condition R0). Here, we show that the resulting system of two
ordinary differential equations helps to pin down all elements of the equilibrium. It also helps to establish the
existence and uniqueness of the labor market equilibrium.
Concretely, we can set up the firm’s profit maximization problem such that the firm chooses the rank z
it wants to occupy in the firm distribution, given the equilibrium objects V (z) = F−1(z), Gz(z), l(z) and
w(V, δ) (the inverse of V (w, δ)).20 In particular, firm optimization in equilibrium requires that no firm of
rank z, with layoff risk δ(z), strictly prefers to offer a value V (z′) associated with a different rank z′ in
firm distribution F (V ), compared to the value, V (z), associated with rank z. Formally, this means that in
equilibrium, the following must be satisfied:
max
z′
(p− w(V (z′), δ(z)))ld(z′, δ(z)), (26)
where w(V (z′), δ(z)) is the wage the zth-most risky firm, with its immutable unemployment risk δ(z), must
pay to provide value V (z′). The term ld(z′, δ(z)) is the steady state firm size of a deviating z-type firm which
offers its workers a value V (z′) instead. Then the rank-z firm will have exactly the same measure of worker
inflows as the rank-z′ firm enjoys, and additionally also rank-z′ firm’s outflow rate to other jobs, but (again)
the rank-z firm cannot do anything to change its own outflow rate to unemployment, δ(z). This means that
20Using these functions, the resulting optimization problem is equivalent to firm optimization with respect to value V or wage
w, taking as given the corresponding functions F (V ), G(V ), l(V, δ). There is one additional aspect that needs to be taken care of:
deviations to values that are not part of the support of F (V ), which by proposition 2 means only values below V0, or above V (1).
This is easily verified: V < V (0) implies zero profit, since no workers will ever find it optimal to accept employment; V > V (1)
implies less profit per worker than V (1) with a firm size equal to the firm size when offering V (1). Hence if a firm does not want to
deviate to V (1), it does not want to deviate to V > V (1).
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outflow rate of a z-firm deviating to V (z′), relative to the outflow rate of the z′-firm itself, is larger by a factor
λ1(1−z′)+δ(z)
λ1(1−z′)+δ(z′) , which implies that the size of the deviating firm is the size of the z
′th-most risky firm divided
by this factor:
ld(z′, δ(z)) =
λ1(1− z′) + δ(z′)
λ1(1− z′) + δ(z) l(z
′) =
λ0u
λ1(1− z′) + δ(z)e
∫ z′
0
λ1
λ1(1−z˜)+δ(z˜)dz˜. (27)
The firm size upon deviating in equation (27) can be formally derived using the firm size as a function of
values in equation (13) in conjunction with lemmas 2 and 3. From equation (27), we see that ld(z′, δ(z))
is differentiable in z′.The first order condition of profit in equation (26) with respect to z′, evaluated at the
equilibrium choice, z′ = z is
(p− w(V (z), δ(z))) ∂l
d(z′, δ(z))
∂z′
∣∣∣∣
z′=z
−
(
∂w(V (z), δ(z))
∂V (z)
dV (z)
dz
)
ld(z, δ(z)) = 0 (28)
(Second-order conditions that establish that this indeed maximizes profit are established in theorem 1 below.)
This can be rewritten as
∂w(V (z),δ(z))
∂V (z)
dV (z)
dz
(p− w(V (z), δ(z))) =
∂ld(z′,δ(z))
∂z′
∣∣∣
z′=z
l(z, δ(z))
. (29)
On the right-hand side is the relative gain in firm size when incrementally increasing the ‘mimicked’ rank z′.
It is profit-maximizing for the zth-most risky firm to be ranked zth in the firm value distribution F (V ) when
the relative gain in firm size from marginally increasing rank at rank z is offset exactly by the relative profit
loss per worker on the left-hand side. Rearranging first-order condition (29), we find that this is satisfied when
dV (z)
dz
= (p− w(V (z), δ(z)))
∂ld(z′,δ(z))
∂z′
∣∣∣
z′=z
l(z, δ(z))
∂w(V (z), δ(z))
∂V (z)
⇐⇒
dV (z)
dz
= (p− w(V (z), δ(z))) 2λ1
λ1(1− z) + δ(z)
1
r + δ(z) + λ1(1− z) . (30)
Thus, equation (30) is a differential equation that captures how much the value needs to change with firm
rank z to guarantee that rank-z firms indeed find it profit-maximizing to offer V (z). It is interesting to briefly
highlight the difference between firms at the bottom of the job security distribution and those higher up. Safer
firms have a higher term 2λ1/(λ1(1−z)+δ(z)) in equation (30), which can be seen from the derivative of this
term with respect to layoff risk δ, which is − 2λ1
(λ1(1−z′)+δ)2 < 0.
21 Safer firms thus compete more aggressively,
ceteris paribus; this raises dV (z)/dz on the left-hand side of equation (30). A higher dV (z)/dz will be a force
21This term is the cross-derivative ∂
2 ln l(z′,δ)
∂z′∂δ = − 2λ1(λ1(1−z′)+δ)2 , which is the differential analogue (now in terms of rank z) to
condition (15).
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that also pushes up wages as a function of firm rank z. It is, however, not the entire story for wages, as the
change in unemployment risk δ(z) also to be taken into accounted.
Note that equation (30) incorporates wage function w(V (z), δ(z)). This mapping depends on distribution
of values offered by firms and the distribution of unemployment risk across firms, as can be seen in section
2.1 on the workers’ optimization, and hence is not an object that can be replaced by an explicit solution at
this stage. However, the change in wage as a function firm rank z can be established more easily, leading to
a second first-order differential equation, which combined with (30) gives rise to a system of two differential
equations that are crucial to characterize the equilibrium.
The pattern of wages offered by differently ranked firm indeed takes into account not only how values
change with firm rank in V (z), but also how simultaneously these higher values can be delivered in part, or
in whole, by the increased job security that a higher-ranked firm provides. As one moves through the ranks of
firms the value offered by firms changes simultaneously with the job security these firms provide, while at any
z, the wage must be given by w(V (z), δ(z)). This means that at any δ(z) that is differentiable, we have 22
dw(V (z), δ(z))
dz
=
∂w(V (z), δ(z))
∂V (z)
dV (z)
dz
+
∂w(V (z), δ(z))
∂δ(z)
δ′(z). (31)
Then, we can decompose the equilibrium wage change with firm rank in into two parts: the competition
component coming from the firm’s wage setting in the firm’s first-order condition (29), ∂w(V (z),δ(z))∂V (z)
dV (z)
dz , and
the effect through the composition of firms on the labor market; with δ′(z) derived from H(δ), capturing how
fast job security increases with firm rank. Substituting (29) into the last expression, yields
dw(z)
dz
= (p− w(z)) 2λ1
λ1(1− z) + δ(z) + δ
′(z)(V (w(z), δ(z))− V0). (32)
While the firm’s optimization pins down dV (z)dz , increased job security of the higher ranked firm itself could
deliver part of the increased value V . If workers value job security a lot, i.e. V (w(z), δ(z)) − V0 is high, or
the higher-ranked firms’ job security is much higher, i.e. δ′(z) is far below zero, this force can even lead to
wage cuts.
The strength of these forces varies with the rank of the firm in the firm-level job-security distribution. For
firms with high job security, the value of employment is significantly different from the value of unemploy-
ment; this means that the term V (w(z), δ(z))−V0 is relatively large. However, simultaneously, for these safer
firms, the gains of holding on to their workers are larger, and hence these firms will compete more fiercely,
22Since it is derived from the cumulative density function H(δ) the function δ(z) is differentiable a.e. With abuse of notation, we
use δ′(z) as a function that is defined everywhere, and consistent with the derivative of δ(z) almost everywhere. Moreover, note that
V (z) is continuous everywhere; if there is a discontinuity in δ(z) at z, ‘compensating wage’ indifference (3) will tell us the size of the
discrete drop in wages at this z (as stated more explicitly in theorem 1).
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as argued below equation (29). It is therefore still not a foregone conclusion whether wages paid will rise or
fall with firm-level job security, nor is it immediate that a greater valuation of job security on the worker side
will indeed lead to wage cuts, as it simultaneously also raises the value of retaining a worker to the firm. One
can see that δ′(z) can potentially play an important role here, scaling V (w(z), δ(z)) − V0, and therefore the
strength of the forces. In the next section, we study the occurrence or absence of wage cuts in exchange for job
security: both can occur depending in part on the distribution of firm types, which is an important determinant
of the extent of competition among firms. The workers’ marginal rate of substitution between wages and job
security (derived in section 2.1) by itself is only half of the story; firms’ imperfect competition is the other
half.
Let us finish this section by putting all pieces together: we can find (w(z), V (z)) as the solution a system
of two differential equations, one from using (28) which tells us ∂V (z)∂z , and (32) combined with (3), which
tells us ∂w(z)dz , both as functions of parameters, distributions and wages w
s(z), w(z) themselves. The solution
to this system of differential equations {V (z), w(z)}, in combination with the appropriate initial conditions
fully characterizes the equilibrium. Moreover, we are able to establish the existence and uniqueness of this
solution, and therefore of the labor market equilibrium, as spelled out in definition 1
Theorem 1 (Existence, Uniqueness, Characterization). Consider functions {w(z), V (z)}, and R0 ∈ R (and
the associated V0 = λ0R0−λ1br(λ0−λ1) ), such that w(z), V (z) are a solution to the system of two ODEs, with, for all z
at which δ(z) is continuous,
dV (z)
dz
= (p− w(z)) 2λ1
λ1(1− z) + δ(z)
1
r + δ(z) + λ1(1− z) (33)
dw(z)
dz
= (p− w(z)) 2λ1
λ1(1− z) + δ(z) + δ
′(z)(V (z)− V0), (34)
and a jump discontinuity at every ẑ such that limz↑ẑ δ(z) > δ(ẑ), w(z) will jump down according to
w(z) = lim
z↑zˆ
w(ẑ)−
(
δ(z)− lim
z↑ẑ
δ(ẑ)
)
(V (z)− V0), (35)
V (z) = lim
z↑ẑ
V (ẑ) (36)
under initial conditions w(0) = R0, and V (0) = V0, where R0 additionally satisfies
R0 = b+ (λ0 − λ1)
∫ 1
0
(V (z)− V0)dz = b+ (λ0 − λ1)
∫ 1
0
(1− z)dV (z)
dz
dz (37)
Denote the inverse of V (z) as F (V ). This distribution, and G(V (z)) = Gz(z), value functions V (w, δ),
and u, Fˆ (w|δ), G(V, δ),F (V, δ), all constructed from {w(z), V˜ (z), R0} are the functions associated with the
steady state equilibrium in the environment; this steady state exists and is unique.
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In this setting it has been necessary to follow a path different from BM and Bontemps et al. towards
characterizing the equilibrium wage distribution: neither wages or values alone are sufficient to characterize
the equilibrium. How powerful competition is driving up the values offered to workers depends on wages
through the instantaneous profit flows p−w, and it depends on the job security of the firm in question. On the
other hand, how wages co-move with job security depends on the valuation of job security, which consist of
the job value lost when losing a job, and how likely this transition is. However, not all elements of equilibrium
depend on both wages and values: firm size only depends on the rank of the firm and its associated job security.
Exploiting this, we are able to solve for equilibrium firm sizes first, and then simultaneously find the wages
and value distributions that have to arise with these firm size.
Given the characterization in theorem 1, it is perhaps insightful to compare the case with heterogeneous
unemployment risk to the standard case in BM and Bontemps et al. without this heterogeneity (δ(z) = δ˜ ∀ z).
In the absence of heterogeneity in δ(z), the two equations (33) pre-multiplied by dw/dV and (34) are identical
to each other: the differential equation w′(z) = (p − w(z))(2λ1/(λ1(1 − z) + δ)) with initial condition
w(0) = R0 has solution
p− w(z)
p−R0 =
(
λ1(1− z) + δ
λ1 + δ
)2
=⇒ F (w) = δ + λ1
λ1
(
1−
(
p− w
p−R0
)0.5)
, (38)
which, on the LHS, is precisely the wage distribution in BM.23
Note that one way of showing existence and uniqueness in Burdett-Mortensen model would combine the
left expression in (38) with (37), to show that T (R0) is linear in R0, while T (p) = b, and T (r) < r, for r
small enough. The proof of theorem 1 relies on the same method: we can rescale the differential equation
(34) by p − w, and show that the term V (z)−V0p−w(z) , which captures closely how the overall rent is divided up
between firm and worker, is independent of R0, and therefore just a function of parameters, unemployment
risk distribution H(δ) and firm rank z. Then, the strategy of the proof is to show that – even though the
problem has two dimensions– there still exists a (now more involved) term A(z) which again depends only on
parameters, H(δ), and firm rank, such that p − w(z) = (p − R0)A(z). From this the continuity of T (R0) in
R0, needed for the existence proof, can be established, and so can the uniqueness.
23Exploiting the ranking property inherent in BM-type models allows one to incorporate more heterogeneity in standard models.
Here, we deal with firm heterogeneity that cannot be incorporated straightforwardly in the standard model, where e.g. there is a simple,
unique one-dimensional mapping between wages and worker’s values. Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2010) exploit a similar ranking
property to deal with time-varying aggregate productivity, an otherwise notoriously difficult problem.
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3 Wages and Transition Hazards
In the previous section, we derived equations which characterized how wages, worker’s values, and firm qual-
ities are linked in equilibrium. In this section, we look more concretely at the labor market outcomes implied
by the characterization.
First, since safer jobs are more attractive jobs, workers in safe jobs are much less likely to separate from
these jobs, whether to unemployment or to another job. This implies the following (where we have, once
again, relegated all proofs to the appendix),
Result 1. The transition rate into unemployment as a function of tenure is decreasing.
To condense language, we will refer to this particular transition rate as the unemployment hazard. Thus,
the standard BM model, augmented with firm heterogeneity in unemployment risk, is able to reproduce an
unemployment hazard that in the aggregate declines with firm tenure (as well as with the overall duration of
the incomplete employment spell), as it does in the data.24
Next, we consider the relationship between the unemployment risk a worker faces, and the wage he re-
ceives. If wages are increasing in the job security that the firm offers, there is in some sense a strong failure
of compensating wage differentials: not only do riskier firms offer lower employment values (established in
proposition 1), but in fact they offer values so much lower that in addition to a higher unemployment risk they
actually pay lower wages. For those jobs at the bottom of the wage distribution, we can derive the following,
without restrictions on parameters or the firm distribution.
Result 2. The lowest wage,R0, is paid by the firm with the highest unemployment risk. There exists a nontrivial
interval of wages [R0, wˆ] where job security increases with wages
Under typical conditions, spelled out next, this interval can span a large part of the wage distribution, while
on the other hand, wage cuts can also occur higher up in the wage distribution. For analytic simplicity and to be
consistent with steady state profit maximization, we let r → 0, and consider mainly the case of a distribution
of firm unemployment risk with a differentiable p.d.f. h(δ).
Result 3. In equilibrium the relation between wages and job security depends on the firm distribution of
unemployment risk in the following way:
1. Wages increase with job security if h′(δ) ≤ 0 (i.e. dwdz > 0 at z˜, where z˜ = 1−H(δ).)
24See e.g. Menzio et al. 2012.
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2. Wage cuts for increased job security will occur if
h(δ)
δ + λ(1−H(δ)) <
∫ δ¯
δ
h(δ˜)
(δ˜ + λ(1−H(δ˜)))2dδ˜ (39)
The first point highlights that wage cuts will not occur for all firms at or above the mode of the distribution
(or the right-most local maximum in a multimodal distribution), and will not occur at any point during the
distribution if the density is (weakly) decreasing in unemployment risk at any δ. Some wage cuts can occur,
e.g., when densities h(δ) have a thin left-tail with sufficient kurtosis, where h(δ)δ rises sufficiently fast in the
left tail. In particular, for any distribution with h(δ)δ <
∫ δ¯
δ
1
δ˜
h(δ˜)
δ˜
dδ˜, wage cuts will occur when λ1 is small
enough.25
In figure 1, we have drawn, in the left panel, the density of log-normal distributions over unemployment
risk. In the right panel, wages are drawn as a function of underlying unemployment risk, for a particular set of
parameters.26 On the x-axis in the right-hand panel is unemployment risk, and therefore job mobility occurs
from right to left. Hence, wage cuts can occur at those unemployment risks δ in the right panel where the graph
is upward-sloping, when the worker is previously employed at a firm with a not too distinct unemployment
risk. Wages increase with unemployment risk for sure wherever the graph is decreasing. Note that indeed the
firm distribution with almost completely decreasing density does not generate any wage cuts, but for the other
two distributions, with the clear left tails, some wage cuts occur when moving from relatively safe firms to
the very safest firms. At the lowest wages, which come with significantly higher unemployment risk, no wage
cuts are observed. At these wages, who are taken in relatively large proportion by the unemployed, we see a
complete absence of compensating wage differentials. In general, the complementarity between wages and job
security works both on the firm’s and worker’s sides, and can push actual wages either up or down, depending
on the distribution. We think that this is a nice illustration of the value of studying unemployment risk and
wage setting in a full-fledged labor market equilibrium setting, as the willingness to take wage cuts for safety
for workers could be offset by the increased competition by firms for the, ceteris paribus, longer-employed and
thus more more valuable workers.
The degree to which firms are in competition with each other is linked to parameter λ1: an increase in this
parameter makes it easier for higher ranked firms to poach workers from lower-ranked firms, and thus raises
firm competition. One could think that an increase in competition among firms will lead firms to offer less
25In case of a discrete distribution, the existence of wage cuts will follow directly from condition (35) in theorem 1. We discussed
this type of wage cuts extensively in a previous version of the paper. This case however is intuitively close to the case where h(δ) is
very close to zero on an interval, in this case (39) implies that for h(δ) small enough over an interval, wage cuts will also occur.
26Note that the proof of theorem 1 establishes that the shape of the function that links wages to unemployment risk does not depend
on R0, b, λ0.
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Figure 1: Left panel: log-normal p.d.f.s of δ, with standard deviation 0.03 (dashed), 0.2 (dotted), 2.0 (safe).
Right panel: wage as a function of unemployment risk (x-axis) (λ1 = 0.23, r = 0.0025, R0 = 0.7, p = 1)
dispersed employment values in equilibrium and hence trace out more closely the workers’ marginal rate of
substitution between job security and wages. This turns out not to occur; instead we can find a lower bound
on λ˜1 for a given distribution H(δ) (with h′(δ)/h(δ)2 bounded from above), such that above this λ˜1, for any
λ0 and b, wages will be increasing in job security throughout.
Result 4. If λ1 > h′(δ)/(h(δ))2, wages will be increasing in job security at δ (dw(z)/dz > 0 at z =
1 − H(δ)), for any λ0, b. If h′(δ)/(h(δ))2 is bounded from above, there exists λ˜1 such that for all λ1 > λ˜1
wages are increasing in job security for all δ, for any b, λ0.
Thus, as the labor market gets more competitive, the scope for wage cuts disappears. In this result, we
keep b and λ0 constant27; while it becomes progressively easier for employed workers to move from job to
job, unemployed workers keep leaving unemployment at the same rate. This keeps the cost of losing one’s
job bounded away from zero, even as λ1 becomes very large. (In the limit: V1(δ) − V0 = p−br+λ+δ .) Thus
when λ1 becomes large enough, the increased competition between firms will drive up wages with job security
throughout the entire wage distribution, even though workers keep experiencing a loss of lifetime utility when
becoming unemployed. Increased competition among firms does not lead to the payment of compensating
wage differentials, it does, quite surprisingly, lead to the opposite, as it strengthens the motive of the low-δ
firms to compete with similar firms. To prove this, we heavily rely on the ranking property, which holds for
27Result 4 is actually stronger, it says that this bound on λ1 will hold, entirely independent of λ0 and b.
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every λ1, and thus the firm ranking is preserved throughout any limit taking with respect to λ1 (and λ0). Thus,
we can calculate firm sizes easily as a function of the rank of the firm as we approach the limit without having
to recalculate the wage distribution. In turn, firm profit maximizing decisions are then still easily characterized,
following theorem 1, even as we move towards the limit, λ1 →∞.
We can also study the case where we let search frictions for both unemployed and employed workers
disappear in the limit.
Result 5. Let λ0 > λ1, λ1 →∞, λ0 →∞, while keeping λ1λ0 = α < 1 constant. Then w(z)→ p for all z.
If we let the frictions for the unemployed disappear, we converge to the same limit as in the standard
BM model without heterogeneity in δ, which equals competitive outcome w(z) = p ∀ z, again without any
compensation for unemployment risk. To see this, note that for reservation wage out of unemployment, R0,
the following holds
R0 − b
p−R0 =(α− 1)
∫ 1
0
λ1(1− z)
δ + λ(1− z)
δ + λ1(1− z)
δ(z) + λ1(1− z)
2λ1
δ(z) + λ1(1− z)
p− w(z)
p−R0 dz (40)
≥ (α− 1)
∫ 1
0
2λ21(1− z)
(δ¯ + λ(1− z))2dz = −2
λ1
λ1 + δ¯
+ 2 log
δ¯ + λ1
δ¯
(41)
As we let λ1 (and λ0 = λ1/α with it) go to infinity in (40), it follows that R0 → p, as the RHS goes to infinity.
Since p > w(z) ≥ R0, it follows that all wages go to p. Since the bound in result 4 is uniform in λ0, we also
know that for λ1 large enough, wages will become increasing in job security for all δ in the process.
As we approach the competitive limit no compensating wages are paid. In the case where search frictions
also disappear in the limit for the unemployed, job security will cease to be a payoff relevant dimension
for workers. This is intuitive because, apart from the loss of ‘search capital’, there is no additional cost to
unemployment.28 Decreasing λ1, λ0 means that search frictions become more important, which implies that
job security becomes more important, and competition between firms becomes more limited, which raises the
potential for wage cuts. Thus somewhat ironically, wage cuts, which seem to relate closely to the notion of
compensating wages paid in competitive settings, are in the environment we study actually associated with a
low degree of competition among firms. Though ironic, the result is intuitive: a low λ1 means that climbing
up the job ladder is a slow process in which gains are lost when becoming unemployed; therefore, at a lower
λ1, workers will value job security more, ceteris paribus. Likewise, a lower λ1 lowers the competition among
firms, i.e. the relative gains of being higher in the value ranking are lower when λ1 is low, hence higher
ranked firms will not increase the values that they offer workers as much. This, however, does not mean that
28If a transition into unemployment comes with an explicit cost instead or in addition to a search cost, then in the limiting economy
only the low turnover firms would survive.
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result 4 immediately follows from the intuition: we need to use, explicitly, the equilibrium characterization,
because the lower values offered by the firms due to the lower competition reduce the valuation of job security,
potentially more than offsetting the direct (ceteris paribus) effect of the decrease in λ1 on the workers’ valuation
of job security. However, result 4 implies that this is not the case, and with a lower λ1 more cases can occur
where firms with higher job security promise a lower value increase than is delivered by their increased job
security alone, and as a result will offer lower wages, thus leading to wage cuts in equilibrium.
4 Discussion
Above, we have established that for a substantial portion of (standard) wage distributions, wages will be
increasing in job security, thus providing a foundation for the observed lack of compensating wage differentials
for job security. The theory emphasizes that, in particular in the lower part of the wage distribution, the forces
that push towards the positive correlation between wages and job security are strong. A further implication is
that the unemployed are the predominant takers of the riskiest jobs which also have a low pay, implying that
unemployed workers are particularly vulnerable for ‘no-pay/low-pay’-cycles in their subsequent labor market
outcomes. When treating job security as any other amenity, entering additively separate in the utility function,
the locus of wage cuts appears less clear: wage cuts could occur at any part of the distribution, while, on the
flip-side, an overall positive correlation could also be generated in any part of the wage offer distribution. In
contrast, the endogenous complementarity in our setting closely ties the low-pay to the no-pay in workers’
histories.
Behind this, we want to emphasize, on-the-job search plays an important role: by itself, it creates hetero-
geneity in worker’s rent and in the expected match termination rate due to employer-to-employer flows. Work-
ers in different firms take jobs in other firms at different rates, and this crucially interacts with heterogeneity
in the rate at which firms send workers into unemployment. Workers care more about job security, ceteris
paribus, when the expected match duration is longer (due to lower outflow rate to other jobs) and firms care
relatively more about retention when the expected match duration is longer (due to a lower separation rate into
unemployment). This complementarity is missed in models that only consider unemployment-to-employment
flows and vice versa.
The randomness of the search technology, on the other hand, does not appear to be essential for our
results. In Pinheiro and Visschers (2013), we show in a directed search setting with job-to-job mobility adapted
from Delacroix and Shi (2006), that safer firms offer higher values than riskier firms. At work are the same
forces as before, including the aforementioned complementarity between outflows to other jobs and outflows
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to unemployment. Because of the job-to-job mobility, workers are again heterogeneous in the lifetime value
they have in their current employment. In higher-value jobs they optimally direct their search towards jobs with
even better conditions – but these come with a lower matching probability. As before, since safer firms care
more about worker retention, they have an additional incentive to offer the high values that attract employed
workers. Unemployed workers care the least of all workers about the unemployment risk of the jobs, and
target employment in risky firms. It then follows that mobility patterns would look similar to our setting, to
the extent that unemployed workers end up in the most risky firms, and long-term employed workers will only
switch to safe firms.
To put our results in a wider perspective: it would be of great interest to further distinguish generally
and quantitatively among the sources of patterns of repeated unemployment and persistence in future low
pay of the unemployed.29 This matters because, each underlying cause has different implications how risk is
distributed in the labor market. If workers are heterogeneous in the propensity to become unemployed, i.e.
if some workers have more trouble than others to hold a job, a more ‘stable’ worker who nevertheless has
become unemployment by a stroke of bad luck will have better prospects than the typical unemployed. The
danger of repeated falls of the job ladder into unemployment would not apply to the same extent to him.30
The concentration of actual inflows into unemployment across workers and firms (that send workers into
unemployment) is likely to tell us more about the importance of each of these dimensions, but the picture is
made murkier by the force of selection on unobservables on both the workers’ and firms’ side of the market,
and also on unobservable match quality. Repeated unemployment spells and low-wage employment spells for
a subset of individuals can arise not only due to worker heterogeneity, but can also occur because workers
who have become unemployed will accept different jobs, in different firms, than long-employed workers. In
particular, the jobs that unemployed workers take, will include jobs with lower wages and a higher risk of
becoming unemployed again.
It is possible to make inferences about the extent of selection by looking in more detail e.g. at the labor
29Perhaps in part because of a strong intuition about the need for compensating differentials to arise when the only heterogeneity
is on the firm side, firm heterogeneity in unemployment risk does not appear to us to have been considered on the same level as
other explanations in the more applied literature focussed (narrowly) on the effect of becoming unemployed on future labor market
outcomes.
30A correlation between wages and job security could occur because low-ability workers are also unstable workers: they prefer
not to stay with the same employer for long (Salop and Salop 1976). Alternatively, their skills are less job specific, making them
more mobile (Neal 1998), or they are repeatedly screened out during a lower-wage probationary period (Wang and Weiss 1998).
Sorting could also behind the worker-specific unemployment risk, with low-ability workers could also sort into risky firms (Evans and
Leighton 1989, which could be modeled in a frictional labor market e.g. by extending Albrecht and Vroman (2002) with on-the-job
search and firm heterogeneity in layoff rates). See also Kaas and Carrillo-Tudela (2011)
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market histories for firms and workers. Using workers’ labor market histories, if unobservable worker het-
erogeneity is important for unemployment patterns, then the entire labor market history of a worker before
a current unemployment spell is informative for future labor market outcomes. In contrast, if only firm and
match quality matter, past matches with firms become irrelevant upon when a worker becomes unemployed,
and hence previous labor market history should not predict future labor market outcomes for the unemployed.
In general, after attempting to control for observable and unobservable worker heterogeneity, the empirical
literature that investigates the causal effects of being unemployed on subsequent employment outcomes, typ-
ically find these to be substantial (see e.g. Arulampalam et al. (2000) and Böheim and Taylor (2002)). This
is consistent with a substantial role for firm or job match heterogeneity in combination with search frictions:
these imply that it is often not easy or quick to find a similarly good employment relationship, or relationship
with a good firm, after an unemployment spell.
Learning about match quality gives rise to an unemployment hazard that could potentially first increase,
but will subsequently decrease with tenure within a firm. (To observe this, one needs data that keeps track of
individual workers over time while matched with a particular firm, while also observing when/whether this
match is broken up.31) Ex ante known differences among firms in unemployment risk, as captured in our
model, shift up or down the firm-specific unemployment hazard uniformly at all tenures across firms. The
role of firm-level heterogeneity in unemployment risk is supported by the empirical finding that observable
firm characteristics indeed can correlate with the unemployment hazard after controlling for tenure effects
(e.g. Winter-Ebmer 2001). Hence firm-differences in unemployment risk can be deduced, at least in part, ex
ante. In the face of firm-level heterogeneity, this paper furthermore emphasizes the equilibrium wage choices:
while there is room for these differences in firm quality to be absorbed in compensating wage differences,
these differences also affect how firms compete, leading them to post wages that typically more than offset any
compensating wage considerations.32
In general, it would be interesting to combine, more formally, ex ante known heterogeneity among firms
with ex-post learning, to draw inferences e.g. about precisely how much a worker knows ex ante about his
outcomes in a potential new employment, how much uncertainty is resolved later, during the match, and what
31With regard to this, longitudinal matched-employer-employee data could simultaneously allows for estimation of worker, firm,
and tenure-within-firm effects.
32Ex ante known firm-level differences in job security, compared to uncertain match quality that is revealed slowly over the course
of the employment relationship can have different implications for worker mobility in the case of workers who have taken a wage
cut. In our model, when workers move to firm taking a wage cut, this firm will have a lower unemployment risk, and a lower total
separation risk (incl. separations to other firms). In the case of uncertain match quality, workers take a wage cut to move to a match
with more variance. After such a move, separation and even unemployment risk can increase.
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this means for the distribution of risk over the labor market, which will feed back to many economic decisions
of workers. 33
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented a model with homogeneous workers and search frictions in which, in equi-
librium, wages do not compensate for differences in unemployment risk. Therefore, workers move, whenever
they have the chance, from risky companies to more stable firms, which are also larger. We are able to charac-
terize the joint distribution of equilibrium wages and job security in a very tractable way, making this model
amenable to further extensions and estimation. Theoretically, we find that wages increase with job security
for the lowest wages; this pattern can extend over a significant part of the wage distribution. While safer firms
can offer lower wages while still attracting more workers, the increased job duration makes a worker more
valuable to the firm, and hence raises their incentive to prevent worker mobility to other firms, which puts an
upwards force on wages. The second force dominates at low wages, and also for large parts of standard firm
distributions, though higher in the wage distribution, depending on the distribution of the heterogeneous firms,
wage cuts could occur.
In our model, a willingness to pay for job security did not arise from some deep discomfort in the utility
function, but rather from the loss of life-time discounted income. As a result, workers at different positions
in the job ladder value job security differently, and a complementarity between the job’s rent and job security
arose endogenously. Taking also into account the firms’ incentives in their wage setting, a potentially large
discrepancy can result between the workers’ willingness to pay for job security (which is different for workers
in different firms), and the overall cross-sectional correlation between wages and job security, which can very
well be positive.
The model also generates an unemployment hazard rate that is declining with tenure, as in the data, while
in the standard Burdett and Mortensen (1998) model it is counterfactually constant. We thus show that unem-
ployment scarring in terms of wages and risk of repeated job losses, arises in equilibrium, resulting neither
33In firm panel data or matched-employer-employee data one could link the firm-average outflow rate into unemployment with
the patterns that occur as function of worker’s tenure. For example, one could attempt to link the how firm-specific slope of the
unemployment outflow rate as a function of job tenure relates to the firm-average level of unemployment risk. To our knowledge, this
is not an dimension of the data that has received substantial attention, and neither do we have clear theoretical predictions. Learning
models set in frictional labor markets most often abstract from the notion of multi-worker firms which differ in an ex-ante known
quality component. In richer models, strategic wage setting is also often abstracted from, by tying wages one-for-one to productivity
by assumption (a notable exception to the latter is Moscarini (2005)).
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from an decline in (perceived) productivity of workers when they become unemployed, nor as a manifestation
of a selection effect on workers, but because of heterogeneity on the firm side.
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APPENDIX
A Proofs
Proof of lemma 1 What remains to be done is to fill in the few gaps that were not taken care of in the main
text. First, note that V (w, δ) exists as the fixed point of the functional mapping T : C → C
TV (w, δ) =
1
r + δ + λ1
(
w + λ1
∫ ∫
max{V (w′, δ′), V (w, δ), V0}dFˆ (w|δ)dH(δ) + δV0
)
. (42)
It further follows straightforwardly from the above equation that V (w, δ) is continuous, increasing in w, and
decreasing in δ when V (w, δ) ≥ V0. Given that the support of H(δ) and Fˆ (w|δ) is bounded by assumption,
V (w, δ) is bounded as well. Then, since V (w, δ) is monotone, continuous and bounded, it is also a.e. dif-
ferentiable with respect to w (Kolmogorov and Fomin (1975), 31.2, th. 6); similarly, it is a.e. differentiable
with respect to δ. At those points, using the right-hand side of equation (2) we find ∂V (w, δ)/∂w in (5).
Again, similarly, we find ∂V (w, δ)/∂δ in (6). From equations (2) or (42), in particular the integration on the
right-hand side of these equations, it follows that V (w, δ) is in fact absolutely continuous (Kolmogorov and
Fomin (1975), 33.2 Th. 5), and therefore, the derivatives in (5) and (6), together with the initial conditions
characterize V (w, δ). (cf. Kolmogorov and Fomin, 33.2 Th. 6). At a zero measure set of points V (w, δ) is not
differentiable; in our formulation, we use (5)-(6) at those points, without affecting the solution V (w, δ).
The results for R0 and V0 in (7) follow from the compensating differential equation (3), which now im-
plies a reservation wage from unemployment R0 that is unaffected by δ at value V (w, δ) = V0. Moreover,
substituting out the double integral term in (1), using V (R0, δ) = V0 in equation (2), yields V0 as a function of
R0 (or vice versa). As V (w, δ) is strictly increasing in w above V0, we can invert it (keeping δ fixed); hence
w(V, δ) exists, is continuous, strictly increasing, and a.e. differentiable. Changing the variable of integration
yields (8).
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Proof of lemma 2 In this proof, we show that the appropriate ratio of limits of a sequence of sets agrees with
(13) a.e. (with respect to F (V, δ)). (We do not have to worry about firm sizes at a set of measure zero of firms
for overall outcomes: anything that happens on a set of firms of measure zero will not affect the choices or
utility and profit attained by workers and other firms.) First, we can define
I(δ, V )
def
=
∫
δ′≤δ,V0≤V ′≤V
(
δ′ + λ1
∫
V˜ >V
dF (V˜ , δ˜) + λ1
∫
δ˜>δ,
V≥V˜ >V ′
dF (V˜ , δ˜)
)
dG(V ′, δ′)(m− u)
−
∫
δ′≤δ,V0≤V ′≤V
(
λ0u+ λ1
∫
δ˜>δ,V˜ <V ′
dG(V˜ , δ˜)(m− u)
)
dF (V ′, δ′) (43)
Then, for δ′′ > δ′ and V ′′ > V ′, we have I(δ′′, V ′′)−I(δ′, V ′′)−I(δ′′, V ′)+I(δ′, V ′) = 0, because in steady
state I(δ, V ) = 0 for every (δ, V ). After some tedious algebra, in which we drop the flow-terms that cancel
each other out, add up the remaining flows where possible, but split the integral such that in one set the upper
bound is not included and in the other set the value to integrate over is a singleton {V ′′}; this results in∫
δ′<δ≤δ′′
V ′<V <V ′′
(
δ + λ1
∫
V˜ >V ′′
dF (V˜ , δ˜) + λ1
∫
δ˜ /∈(δ′,δ′′]
V <V˜≤V ′′
dF (V˜ , δ˜)
)
dG(V, δ)
+
∫
δ′<δ≤δ′′
V=V ′′
(
δ + λ1
∫
V˜ >V ′′
dF (V˜ , δ˜)
)
dG(V, δ)
=
∫
δ′<δ≤δ′′
V ′<V <V ′′
(
λ0u+ λ1
∫
V˜≤V ′
dG(V˜ , δ˜) + λ1
∫
δ˜ /∈(δ′,δ′′]
V ′≤V˜ <V
dG(V˜ , δ˜)
)
dF (V, δ)
+
∫
δ′<δ≤δ′′
V=V ′′
(
λ0u+ λ1
∫
V˜≤V ′
dG(V˜ , δ˜)
)
dF (V, δ) (44)
Now, we can take the limit as δ′ → δ′′ and V ′ → V ′′. There are two cases: (i) ∫V=V ′′,all δ dF (V, δ) = 0,
and (ii)
∫
V=V ′′,all δ dF (V, δ) > 0. In case (i), the terms on the second and fourth line equal zero, while the
rightmost terms in the integral on the first and third line are equal in value to an integral that has a strict upper
or lower bound on values, i.e. λ1
∫
δ˜ /∈(δ′,δ′′]
V <V˜≤V ′′
dF (V˜ , δ˜) = λ1
∫
δ˜ /∈(δ′,δ′′]
V <V˜ <V ′′
dF (V˜ , δ˜)
def
= T (V, δ′). Moreover, T is
continuous at (δ′′, V ′′), with T (δ′′, V ′′) = 0 , so we have
(δ + λ1(1− F (V ′′))
lim δ′→δ′′
V ′→V ′′
∫
δ′<δ<δ′′
V ′<V≤V ′′
dG(V, δ)
lim δ′→δ′′
V ′→V ′′
∫
δ′<δ<δ′′
V ′<V≤V ′′
dF (V, δ)
= (δ + λ1(1− F (V ′′))l(V ′′, δ) = λ0u+ λG(V ′′),
using that dG(V
′′,δ)
dF (V ′′,δ) = l(V
′′, δ), and that G(V ′′), F (V ′′) are continuous at V ′′. Rearranging yields (13).
For case (ii), we can first take the limit V ′ → V ′′ on both sides of the equation. The terms on the first and
third line go to zero. If the second and fourth line are zero as well, we are dealing a set {(V, δ)|V = V ′′, δ ∈
(δ′, δ′′]} that is of measure zero in F , which wlog for the aggregate patterns, we can ignore. Suppose therefore
that B(δ′, δ′′) def= {(V, δ)|V = V ′′, δ ∈ (δ′, δ′′]} is of positive measure. Then in the limit as V ′ → V ′′ (44)
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reduces to∫
δ′<δ≤δ′′
V=V ′′
(
δ + λ1
∫
V˜ >V ′′
dF (V˜ , δ˜)
)
dG(V, δ) =
∫
δ′<δ≤δ′′
V=V ′′
(
λ0u+ λ1
∫
V˜ <V ′′
dG(V˜ , δ˜)
)
dF (V, δ) (45)
Consider now the limit as δ′ → δ′′ while B(δ′, δ′′) stays of positive measure (if it becomes of zero measure,
we can ignore it, wlog). The terms between brackets inside the integrals stay constant, and hence can be taken
outside the integrals. Dividing both sides by
∫
δ′<δ≤δ′′
V=V ′′
dF (V, δ), and taking the limit wrt δ, we have
(δ + λ1(1− F+(V ′′))
limδ′→δ′′
∫
δ′<δ≤δ′′
V ′=V ′′
dG(V, δ)
limδ′→δ′′
∫
δ′<δ≤δ′′
V ′=V ′′
dF (V, δ)
= (δ + λ1(1− F+(V ′′))l(V ′′, δ) = λ0u+ λG−(V ′′),
where (1− F+(V ′′) = ∫V˜ >V ′′ dF (V˜ , δ˜) and G−(V ) = ∫V˜ <V ′′ dG(V˜ , δ˜). 
Proof of proposition 1 To spell out the last step in the proof, consider
(p− w(Vs, δl))l(Vs, δl)
(p− w(Vr, δl))l(Vr, δl) ≥
(p− w(Vs, δh))l(Vs, δh)
(p− w(Vr, δh))l(Vr, δ) (46)
This implies that either
(p− w(Vs, δl))
(p− w(Vr, δl)) ≥
(p− w(Vs, δh))
(p− w(Vr, δh)) , (47)
in which case it must be that Vs ≥ Vr by equation (19); and/or
l(Vs, δl)
l(Vr, δl)
≥ l(Vs, δh)
l(Vr, δ)
, (48)
in which case it again must be that Vs ≥ Vr by the converse to equation (15). Since these two cases cover all
possibilities (using that all terms are positive), it must be that Vs ≥ Vr. 
Proof of proposition 2. First, the same argument that established that G˜(V, δ) is absolutely continuous with
respect to F˜ (V, δ) can be made to establish that F˜ (V, δ) is absolutely continuous with respect to G˜(V, δ),
which then necessarily implies that each property (i)-(iii) applies to F (V ), if and only if it applies to G(V ).
To establish property (ii), towards a contradiction, consider a V which is offered by a strictly positive mass
of firms, with δ1 as the infimum of those types offering this value. The expected profit gain for this type when
offering a wage that implies a value V + ε is greater than
dpi
dε
> −(r + δ + λ1) ε l(V, δ1) + (p− w(V, δ))λ1G
−(V + ε)− λ1G−(V )
λ1(1− F+(V )) + δ1 , (49)
where the first term follows from the fact that dw(V, δ)/dV < r+ δ+λ(1−F+(V )) almost everywhere. The
change in firm size (from offering a value ε higher than V ) is larger than the left-most term. Note that a mass
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point at V implies that, there exists a η > 0, such that for all ε > 0, G−(V + ε) − G−(V ) ≥ η(λ1+δ¯)λ1 > 0.
Then, as ε→ 0, dpidε ≥ (p− w(V, δ))η > 0 and hence a strictly profitable deviation exists to offering for firms
who offer V , to offer V +ε with ε small enough. Moreover, this applies to a non-zero measure of agents, since
it holds all firms offering V : the argument above does not depend on the size of δ.
Next, (towards contradiction) consider the case where the support of F (V ) is not connected. Let V be
the minimum value in the support of F (V ), and w¯s the corresponding maximum value. Then, there exist
V < V1 < V2 < V¯ such that F (V1) = F (V2), and G(V1) = G(V2) by the continuity of F (V ), G(V ).
Consider a firm posting at V2, this firm can keep the same firm size but make strictly more profit when deviating
to V1. If V > V0, the same argument applies: the firm offering V can deviate to V0, which does not affect his
firm size, but strictly raises the profit per worker. 
Proof of theorem 1 There are three steps in this proof. First, one can show that the equilibrium objects
F (V ), G(V ), V (w, δ), Fˆ (w|δ), R0 constructed from V (z), w(z) satisfy workers’ and firms’ optimization.
This is straightforward, with this and the derivation in the paper, we have established that a steady state
equilibrium corresponds to {V (z), w(z), V0} and vice versa.34 Second, we establish that the second-order
conditions are also satisfied whenever the first-order conditions hold. Finally, we show that the existence of
the equilibrium is guaranteed, and its uniqueness.
Pseudoconcavity of the firm’s problem Secondly, we have to check that the first-order conditions indeed
pick the maximum in the firm’s problem, at any point where δ(z) is continuous and differentiable. We can ver-
ify that the problem is pseudo-concave, using dV (z)/dz in equation (34) and the firms’s first-order condition
(28) by showing the derivative of the first-order condition below is negative when (29) holds.
d
dz′
(
(p− w(V (z′), δ(z)))∂l
d(z′, δ(z))
∂z′
−
(
∂w(V (z′), δ(z))
∂V (z′)
dV (z′)
dz′
)
ld(z′, δ(z))
)
(50)
Evaluated at a point where the first order condition is equal to zero (z = z′), this has the same sign as
∂
∂z′
(
(p− w(V (z′), δ(z))) 2λ1
λ1(1− z′) + δ(z)
)
− ∂
∂z′
(
∂w(V (z′), δ(z))
∂V (z′)
∂V (z′)
∂z′
)
(51)
Evaluating the above term at z = z′, the second term equals ∂∂z′
(
(p− w(V (z′), δ(z))) 2λ1λ1(1−z′)+δ(z′)
)
, which
differs from the first, left-most, term only by δ(z) vs. δ(z′) in the denominator. Therefore, the only term that
does not cancel out between the first and second term of second-order condition (51) is
(p− w(V (z), δ(z)) δ
′(z)
(λ(1− z) + δ(z))2 < 0, (52)
which is negative, since δ′(z) < 0.
34For completeness, this in appendix B.
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Existence and uniqueness of the fixed point R0. Finally, we have to show existence and uniqueness of the
reservation wage R0 = w(0), and associated V0 = λ0R0−λ1br(λ0−λ1) = V (0), satisfying (33), (34), (37). From this,
the existence and uniqueness of the steady state equilibrium then follows. Index dV (z;R0)dz ,
dw(z;R0)
dz by initial
condition R0; then (37) is the solution to the following fixed point
R0 = T (R0), where T (R0) = b+ (λ0 − λ1)
∫ 1
0
(1− z)dV (z;R0)
dz
dz (53)
Note that dV (z)dz depends implicitly on the reservation only through (p− w(z)).
Manipulating (33) and (34), we can define x(z) = V (z)−V0p−w(z) and find that the system of two equations
dV (z)/dz and dw(z)/dz can equivalently be written as two equations of which one differential equation only
takes itself as argument,
d(p− w(z))
dz
= −(p− w(z))
(
2λ1
λ1(1− z) + δ(z) + δ
′(z)x(z)
)
(54)
dx(z)
dz
=
2λ1
λ1(1− z) + δ(z)
1
r + λ1(1− z) + δ(z) +
(
2λ1
δ(z) + λ1(1− z)
)
x(z) + δ′(z)x(z)2. (55)
Note that p− w(0) = p−R0, and x(0) = 0. Note that d(p−w(z;R0))dR0 , by standard FODE theory, is continuous
in R0, and we will see this derived below as well. Consider first the interval [0, z˜] on which δ(z) is continuous.
On this interval, x(z) does not depend on R0. We can rewrite (54) to get
d(p−w(z))
dz
(p− w(z)) = −
(
2λ1
δ(z) + λ1(1− z) + δ
′(z)x(z)
)
; (56)
Integrating over z yields
p− w(z) = e−
∫ z
0
(
2λ1
δ(z)+λ1(1−z) +δ
′(z)x(z)
)
dz
(p−R0), (57)
where the exponential term does not depend on R0. It follows immediately that
d(p− w(z))
dR0
= −e−
∫ z
0
(
2λ1
δ(z)+λ1(1−z) +δ
′(z)x(z)
)
dz
< 0.
To generalize this to general distributionsH(δ), consider next a point where δ(z) is discontinuous: this a point
where δ(z) drops discretely. We want to show that the properties of d(p−w(z))dR0 ,
dx(z)
dR0
are preserved. Consider
first x(z), from (35), which in turn comes from the worker’s indifference curve in equation (3),
(p− w(zˇ)) = lim
z↑zˇ
(p− w(z))− (δ(zˇ)− lim
z↑zˇ
δ(z))(V (z)− V0) (58)
To shorten notation, let, for a generic function y(z), the limit limz↑zˇ y(z) be denoted by yL(z). Then we can
rewrite the above equation (58) as(
x(z)
)−1
=
(
xL(z)
)−1 − (δ(z)− δL(z)) ⇐⇒ (59)
x(z) =
xL(z)
xL(z)− (δ(z)− δL(z)) < xL(z). (60)
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Hence, if dxL(z;R0)/dR0 = 0, it follows that dx(z;R0)/dR0 = 0.
Thus, the irresponsiveness of dx(z)dR0 is also preserved whenever δ(z) drops discretely. Let Z = {ζi}
be the countable set of ranks z at which δ(z) drops discretely; define additionally ζ0 = 0. Then, letting
ζ¯(z) = sup{ζ ∈ Z|ζ < z}
p− w(z) = (p−R0)
( ∏
{i|ζi∈Z,ζi<z}
e
− ∫ ζiζi−1( 2λ1δ(z′)+λ1(1−z′) +δ′(z′)x(z′))dz′( xL(ζi)
xL(ζi)− (δ(ζi)− δL(ζi))
)
· e−
∫ z
ζ¯(z)
(
2λ1
δ(z′)+λ1(1−z′)
+δ′(z′)x(z′)
))
⇐⇒ (61)
p− w(z) = (p−R0)A(z), (62)
summarizing the entire bracketed term, which only depends on firm rank z and fundamentals but not on R0,
in equation (61)into term A(z) in (62). 35 From this it immediately follows that d(p−w(z;R0))dR0 = −A(z) < 0.
Moreover the T (R0) mapping becomes
T (R0) = b+ (p−R0)(λ0 − λ1)
∫ 1
0
2λ1(1− z′)
λ1(1− z′) + δ(z′)
1
r + δ(z′) + λ1(1− z′)A(z
′)dz′ (63)
Denoting the term post-multiplying (p−R0) by B, we find
R0 =
(b/p+ B)
1 + B
p, (64)
which for any b ≤ p gives the reservation wage R0. This establishes the existence, and the uniqueness of the
equilibrium reservation wage of the unemployed, and given the existence and uniqueness of the firm posting
and workers’ value function given the reservation wage R0, it establishes the overall existence and uniqueness
of the equilibrium|. 
Proof of Result 1 The inflow into employment λ0u+ λG(z) = l(z)(δ(z) + λ(1− z)), the probability that
an inflow at time t survives until t + τ is e(δ(z)+λ1(1−z))τ ; thus the number of workers in the zth firm who
have been around τ periods teu(z, τ)
def
= l(z)(δ(z) + λ(1 − z)e−(δ(z)+λ(1−z))τ . Then, the derivative of the
35A similar result holds true in the standard Burdett and Mortensen model, where
p− w(z) = (p−R0)
(
λ1(1− z) + δ
λ1 + δ
)2
,
however, here we have take care of the heterogeneity in δ, and the resulting influence on the wages (with wage cuts etc.). Notice that
if we set δ′(z) = 0 and hence ∆(z) = 0 and x(z) = 0 ∀z, the Burdett and Mortensen result in fact follows. The observation that a
similar property is preserved in our more complicated setting is encouraging for the wider applicability of the BM-type wage posting
framework, e.g. when incorporating further heterogeneity.
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empirical hazard rate with respect to tenure is
d ln
(∫ 1
0 δ(z)teu(z, τ)dz∫ 1
0 teu(z, τ)dz
)/
dτ = −
∫ 1
0
(δ(z)− δave)teu(z, τ) (δ(z) + λ1(1− z))dz∫
δaveteu(z′, τ)dz′
< 0 (65)
The derivative dteu(z, τ)/dτ = −teu(z, τ)(δ(z)+λ1(1−z)). Define δave
∫
teu(z
′, τ)dz′ =
∫
δ(z′)teu(z′, τ)dz′.
Then
∫ 1
0 (δ(z)− δave)teu(z, τ)dz equals zero; since δ(z)− δave and (δ + λ1(1− z)) are both decreasing, the
latter one strictly, the integral term in (65) is positive, establishing the result.
Proof of Result 2 We have to make sure not only that w(z) is increasing on an interval [0, z˜] itself, but
also that there exists an interval [0, zˇ] where additionally for no further z > zˇ we have that w(z) < w(z˜).
By theorem 1, locally, for z close 0, we have w(z) strictly increasing, while by proposition 2 V (z) strictly
increasing everywhere. Then immediately there exists z˜ > 0 such that w(z) is strictly increasing for all
0 < z < z˜. Now, towards a contradiction, suppose that there does not exist a zˇ > 0 such that for all z > z˜,
it holds that w(z) > w(zˇ). Then, there must exist a sequence {zn} with zn > zˇ, such that w(zn) → R0. By
(3), then also V (zn) → V0. But then, there exists an n such that V (zn) < V (zˇ), contradicting the ranking
property/the strict monotonicity of V (z).
Proof of Result 3 Note that since dw(0)/dz > 0, at the the zˇ from which onwards an interval of wage cuts
occurs, both dw(zˇ)/dz = 0 and d2w∗(zˇ)/(dzdz) < 0, i.e. dw∗(z)/dz cuts 0 from above, at zˇ. Note that a
point at which first and second derivative are zero will not translate in any wage cuts, or strict decrease of wage
in job security. The second derivative at zˇ equals
d2w∗
dzdz
= −dw
∗
dz
2λ1
λ1(1− z) + δ(z) + (p− w
∗(z))
2λ1(λ1 − δ′(z))
(λ1(1− z) + δ(z))2 + δ
′′(V (ws(z), δ)− V0)
+ δ′(z)
dV (z)
dz
. (66)
Note that after substituting in dV (z)/dz from (33), the terms with δ′(z) cancel out. Evaluated at a point where
dw/dz = 0, and letting r → 0, this turns into
d2w∗
dzdz
∣∣∣∣
dw∗
dz
=0
= (p− w∗(z)) 2λ
2
1
(λ1(1− z) + δ(z))2 + δ
′′(V (ws(z), δ)− V0) (67)
This can be smaller than zero only if δ′′(z) < 0, which in turn occurs if and only if h′(δ) > 0, since δ′(z) =
−1/h(δ) and δ′′(z) = h′(δ)
h(δ)2
δ′(z).
The second point follows from (34) being negative. Substituting in V (z) − V0 =
∫ z
0 dV (z)/dzdz into
dw(z)/dz in equation (34), a change of the integrating variable (dz = −h(δ)dδ), this can be written equiva-
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lently as
(p− w(1−H(δ))) 2λ1
δ + λ1(1−H(δ)) <
1
h(δ)
∫ δ¯
δ
2λ1
(δ˜ + λ(1−H(δ˜)))2 (p− w(1−H(δ˜)))h(δ˜)dδ˜
Since p − w((1 − H(δ˜))) > p − w(1 − H(δ)) for δ˜ > δ if no other wage cuts with increased job security
have occurred, the above equation will be negative whenever (39) holds. (In the other case, if wage cuts have
occurred lower in the value distribution (at lower z), then point 2. holds trivially.)
Proof of Result 4 We can show this by establishing that d
2w(z˜)
dwdw < 0, and
dw(z˜)
dz = 0 cannot occur for
λ1 >
h′(δ)
(h(δ))2
.Note that the existence of wage cuts implies a z such that dw(z)/dz = 0, d
2w(z)
dzdz ≤ 0. This
implies that at that z, from (34) and (67),
(p− w(z)) 2(λ1)
2
δ(z) + λ1(1− z) < −δ
′′(z)
∫ z
0
dV (z′)
dz′
dz (68)
(p− w(z)) 2λ1
δ(z) + λ1(1− z) = −δ
′(z)
∫ z
0
dV (z′)
dz′
dz (69)
Dividing the RHS of (68) by the RHS of (69), and similarly for the LHS, this yields
λ1 < δ
′′(z)/δ′(z) =
h′(δ)
(h(δ))2
as a necessary condition. Hence if λ1 >
h′(δ)
(h(δ))2
, we do not satisfy the necessary condition, and therefore can
rule out dw(z)/dz < 0 at z = 1−H(δ).
Proof of Result 5 is in the main text
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ADDITIONAL MATERIAL (NOT FOR PUBLICATION)
B Theorem 1, verification
Theorem 1: Direct Verification in terms of Original Equilibrium Objects In the paper, we derived
{V (z), w(z), R0} satisfying (33), (34), (37) from the equilibrium conditions. Here, we outline the reverse
argument: any set {V (z), w(z), R0} satisfying (33), (34) and (37) corresponds to a steady state equilibrium
with the equilibrium objects listed in definition 1.
The reverse construction of equilibrium objects, such as Fˆ (w|δ) etc., is very straightforward, and we will
mention it here for the sake of completeness. We construct (i) the aggregate conditions and distributions,
then show that these are consistent with the orginal (ii) firm’s optimization, and (iii) the original worker’s
optimization. First invert V (z), to construct F (V ), G(V ) = Gz(F−1(V )), and V (w, δ) implicitly from
V (z), w(z), δ(z) for those wages that are actually posted on the equilibrium path. Then we can construct
Fˆ (w|δ) from δ(z), w(z), using that if δ(z) is strictly decreasing at z, then F (w(z)|δ(z)) = 1, while if δ(z) is
constant on a compact interval, then we isolate this interval, rescale it to [0,1] and invert the re-scalled w(z)
to find Fˆ (w|δ). F˜ (V, δ), G˜(V, δ) can be constructed straightforwardly from F (wˆ|δ) and H(δ), or from V (z)
and δ(z) directly by the monotonicity of the latter functions. Similarly for G˜(V, δ).
Now we have to show that these distribution are consistent with optimal decision making, (ii)-(iii). Given
F (V ), V (w, δ), where for off-equilibrium (w, δ) we use the same partial derivatives as in lemma 1, to derive
the entire function V (w, δ). For worker optimization and firm optimization, consider that firms choose w in
the profit maximization, which leads to the following first order condition
(p− w)∂l(V (w, δ), δ)
∂w
− l(V (w, δ), δ) = 0, (70)
which can be rewritten as
1 = (p− w)
∂l(V (w,δ),δ)
∂V
l(ws, δ)
dV (w, δ)
dw
= 0, ⇐⇒
∂w
∂V (w,δ)
p− w(V (z), δ(z)) =
2λ1F
′(V )
δ + λ(1− F (V )) (71)
Using F ′(V ) = (dV (z)/dz)−1, we can verify that (28) and (31) combined with (33) and (34) imply the
equivalence of (71) and (28). In other words, given the constructed distributions, firms indeed maximize their
profit when taking the original optimization problem with respect to posted wage w to post. Moreover, if
{V (z), w(z), R0} does not satisfy (33), then the first order condition of wages (71) is likewise violated.
Finally, consider the worker’s optimization. This is fully captured in V (w, δ) and R0. Value function
V (w, δ) in turn is characterized by partial derivatives (5) and (6). Function list {V (z), w(z), δ(z)} defines
points of V (w, δ) that occur in equilibrium as a parametric equation of z. For a generic ‘parametric equation’
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it has to hold that dV/dz = ∂V/∂w · dw/dz + ∂V/∂δ · dδ/dz. The equivalence of this and (34) after the
appropriate substitutions for distributions using dw/dz from (33) follows. Finally, the equivalence of R0 in
(37), and R0 defined in (8), follows directly from a change of the variable of integration.
Hence the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium {V (z), w(z), R0} maps into the existence and
uniqueness of the equilibrium as laid out in definition 1.
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C Putting a foundation under the heterogeneous unemployment risk
Model
Following the knowledge hierarchy literature (see Garicano (2000) and Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg
(2006), for example), we assume a firm is an organization that handles a flow of production tasks. These tasks
can be scaled, so that any worker can be fully occupied with her own flow. Each task requires specialized
knowledge to be completed. If a task is successfully completed, it results in a flow output of p. If the worker
fails to complete a task, the flow output is 0 (or otherwise low enough to make it worthless to keep a worker).
We assume that there is a change in tasks faced by a given worker at a Poisson rate ζ ∈ (0,∞) . The new
task is drawn 36 from a distribution H (·) with support [z, z] and density h′ (·) < 0. Therefore, based on
the distribution’s characteristics, problems are ranked from the most to the least common ones, and the most
common problems require the least amount of knowledge.
We consider that there is no team production, in the sense that each worker in the firm either solves a task
by herself or not at all. We also assume that workers cannot be rellocated to a different task. Suppose that such
a worker acquires the knowledge necessary to solve the tasks in a set A ⊂ [z, z] . Since h′ (·) < 0, if there is
any cost to acquire knowledge, it is optimal that A is a subset starting from z. Therefore, if A = [z, z0], the
probability that a worker solves a given task is H (z0). Imagine that workers decide how much knowledge
to acquire before they enter the labor market. Since workers are homogeneous, there is an optimal amount
A∗ = [z, z∗] that workers will acquire37. Notice that, if the worker cannot solve a problem, given task
persistence and a bad enough productivity in this case, the optimal decision by the firm as well as the worker
it is to destroy the job match. Therefore, a worker is dismissed with probability ζ [1−H (z0)] .
Following Cremer (1993) and Cohen and Bacdayan (1994), we assume that a firm is a set of knowledge and
management practices that are shared by workers in an organization, boosting these workers’ ability to solve
problems. In this sense, we consider that a firm is able to provide the worker the knowledge to solve problems
in the range [z0, z1] , for example. Then, the probability a worker is dismissed becomes ζ [1−H (z1)] . We
assume that this additional knowledge is tacit and cannot be transferred across firms, being part of the firm’s
total factor productivity38.
36Therefore, as in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), we have persistence in task-specific shocks.
37We assume a convex cost of education with limz→z c (z) =∞ such that it is not optimal for workers to cover the entire support.
38There is clear evidence in the literature that managerial practices survive changes in top managerial team (Bloom and Van Reenen,
2007) as well as major firm restructures, as spin offs - Cronqvist, Low, and Nilsson (2009) find that spin-off firms have practices closer
to their parent companies than to its industry peers even after over long periods of time as well as after changes in the managerial team.
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For example, let’s assume that there are two types of firms, that are identical on every aspect but their
levels of institutional knowledge, i.e., knowledge embodied in their management practices and procedures.
Therefore, let’s consider type s firms that provide workers with knowledge over the interval [z0, zs] and type
d firms that provide workers with knowledge over the interval [z0, zd] with zd < zs. While workers from firm
s will be unable to solve a problem and be dismissed with probability ζ [1−H (zs)], workers in a type d firm
will be dismissed with probability ζ [1−H (zd)]. Therefore, workers in d firms are more likely to be laid
off - They face an additional ζ [H (zs)−H (zd)] probability of being dismissed. Therefore, these differences
in managerial practices and or codefied knowledge that can be access by workers generate differences in job
destruction rates among firms.
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